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ARTICLE
ETHICS IN THE SHADOW OF THE
LAW:




This article is a series of meditations on texts. The focus is on the
moral quandry a citizen faces when confronted with what he or she
perceives to be an unjust or immoral law or policy, emanating from
the State in which that citizen has membership. As such, it is a con-
tribution to the rich literature of political obligation. It joins the long
debate in jurisprudence and political and legal theory over the citi-
zen's "obligation to obey the law," or "fidelity to law."1 It joins that
debate obliquely, however, not by trying to argue philosophically for
one particular theory of political obligation, but by reflecting on inter-
esting and historically important texts in that literature. The particular
texts have been chosen for two reasons: (1) each has had a position of
historic prominence in the debate, and (2) each represents not just an
abstract argument, but the position of a person who has a direct and
dramatic confrontation with the State over issues of justice and obli-
gation. Even when the person involved is fictional, someone's life or
freedom is on the line and, therefore, provides a "thick" story of a real
quandry.
1 Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Director of Center
for Professional Ethics, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
I The debate begins famously in the West. See PLATO, Crito, in THE LAST DAYS OF
SOCRATES 69, 69-92 (Hugh Tredennick & Harold Tarrant trans., Penguin Books 1993) (discuss-
ing Crito's suggestion that Socrates escape from prison) [hereinafter Crito]. In recent times, an
entire course book in jurisprudence has been organized around the concept of obligation. See
STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB, JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
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For a long time in the West, there was a consensus that the exis-
tence of a law entailed a prima facie obligation to obey it.2 That obli-
gation could only be overcome by a more stringent moral obligation.
Over the past three decades, that consensus has been attacked in a
series of articles by prominent philosophers, who find no basic obli-
gation to obey the law at all.3 Unfortunately the debate has been con-
ducted at a high level of abstraction, and has centered on the narrow
question of the existence of a prima facie obligation.4 I find the de-
bate both remote and sterile. It never gets to the more important,
moral issue: Faced with a law I believe to be unjust or immoral, what
should I do? For those who argue that there is no prima facie obliga-
tion to obey the law, the concern may be met too easily. Do what is
otherwise the right thing, discounting the morally neutral fact of the
law itself. The problem is, however, that the law is never quite so
easily dismissed. It plays a role in the moral debate at least because it
raises expectations or creates patterns or otherwise partakes of the
moral webs in which humans are caught. Of course, there are many
who believe the prima facie moral obligation exists. Most philoso-
phers who do not accept the prima facie obligation still seem to admit
the relevance of law to moral decision-making, but they choose not to
discuss that relevance because of their focus on the abstract question
of the existence of a prima facie obligation to obey the law. I want to
tackle the more particular moral issue head-on.
I come to this debate late in my academic career, but from a curi-
ous early history. After graduating from the Penn Law School in
1966, I had the privilege of spending the following academic year
under the tutelage of H. L. A. Hart, then in his prime as Professor of
Jurisprudence at Oxford. Under Hart's generous supervision, I pro-
duced a graduate thesis entitled The Moral Justification for Civil Dis-
obedience. This was 1966-67, the hey-day of the civil rights and
anti-Vietnam War movements in America. I wanted to understand
where a citizen, especially one who was a newly-minted lawyer,
might stand on this question of political obligation. Although I de-
fended my thesis well enough to receive my degree, I was dissatisfied
with the results of my efforts, and never tried to publish the piece.
The difficulty lay in a fundamental disagreement I had with Professor
2 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 350-55 (1971) (assuming the existence of a
prima facie obligation to obey the law).
3 Of course many jurists and philosophers accept the idea of a prime facie obligation.
For a compilation of writings on this subject, see THE DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW (William A.
Edmundson ed., 1999) [hereinafter DUTY TO OBEY].
4 See M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, in DUTY TO
OBEY, supra note 3, at 75, 76 (arguing that there is no prima facie obligation to obey all laws).
Smith's article is both seminal and typical.
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Hart. He allowed my topic, but insisted that I should make a "law-
yer's" contribution to the question. I should not try to do moral phi-
losophy itself, but should merely help moral philosophers in their task
of "justification," by teaching them something helpful about law. I
argued with Professor Hart against this approach, but submitted to my
advisor's position. Subsequently I went on to specialize as an aca-
demic in the ethics of lawyers, determined that I should try to inte-
grate my law-thinking with my moral-thinking, and help others to do
the same. Thus, this article is not just another jurisprudential foray
into the minefields of political obligation. It is an attempt to do prac-
tical ethics, not an original effort in moral philosophy. It is also the
first of three such efforts. I plan to follow this article with an article
on the political obligation of the judge and another on the lawyer's
political obligation.
For me, the positivistic separation between law and morality has
thinned efforts to understand each. It is like trying to understand the
left hand without mention of the right hand. It can be done, but every
effort at real understanding entails an attempt to come to terms with
both. The great positivist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., called the law
"the witness and external deposit of our moral life." Simultaneously,
Holmes insisted that even the language of law and morality must be
distinct.5 Law influences morality as morality influences law. It is a
dynamic two-way street. This is not a definitional issue. It makes
sense to talk of "unjust laws." It just makes no sense to try to under-
stand one without trying to understand the other. This may seem an
audacious statement. However, I think one's specific moral obliga-
tion in a given case is often shaped or dictated by law in reasonably
just democratic societies. We stop at a red light in city traffic because
we do not want to cause an accident that brings harm to ourselves or
to others. However, we stop specifically because the light is red and
the law directs up to stop.
Thus, although the question "What should I do in the face of an
unjust law?" is wholly "ethical," it cannot be answered without grap-
pling with the concept of law itself. This is also what I am attempting
to do, but again I do so obliquely through an examination of impor-
tant texts.
A word on terminology. Although it is commonplace to use the
words "ethics" and "morality" as synonyms, for purposes of clarity I
want to insist on separate meanings. I mean to use the word "ethics"
when talking about the philosophical effort to clarify and give coher-
ent meaning to the moral life. In philosophical parlance, this means
5 Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,459 (1897).
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"normative" ethics, as opposed to descriptive ethics or meta-ethics,
although both of these branches of philosophical ethics play a role in
understanding normative ethics.6 I will use the word "morality" to fix
on those actions and behaviors (including intention and other mental
states) which deal with fundamental matters of good and evil, right
and wrong, judgment and character, virtue and vice, values and
choices. Morality is largely a social idea. Our "morality" is learned
in a variety of ways-mostly, by being part of one or more moral
communities.7 Ways of behaving are taught (or learned) implicitly or
explicitly in all kinds of communities, from family to neighborhood to
church to political entity to profession. Sometimes one moral com-
munity so dominates a person's life that his or her morality is a fair
representation of that community's morality. Often there is overlap
and conflict between the moral views of one or many communities.
Ethics presents an opportunity to critique any moral position within
any moral community. Some argue that no objective ethical positions
exist in the world. The best we can do is live richly within one moral
community-and hang on. Presently in modem America, it is nearly
impossible to live within just one moral community. Diversity is
more than a politically correct slogan. It is our reality, our heritage,
our polyglot lot. Moreover, ethics is the philosophical discipline that
presents the challenge to every moral community to justify its princi-
ples and way of life to the larger miscellaneous group. I believe there
is no trump card, either in terms of an ethical system, or a moral
community. For many people, their religious beliefs, ethnicity, or
some other community reference point, clearly dominates their moral
behavior. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of the moral life that Alas-
dair MacIntyre describes is real enough.8 At least it is clear that, even
when the fragmentation does not seem as serious substantively as it
does to MacIntyre (as it does not to the authors of Habits of the
Hear9), there still seems to be the absence of a moral language com-
prehensive enough to be utilized by desperate communities. Never-
theless, there are moral exemplars-people whose virtuous lives in-
spire us. An ethical evaluation of people, caught in the quandry of
trying to live a good life in the face of a seemingly unjust law brings
us closer to understanding the nature of political obligation in a con-
crete way. I begin with Socrates, as he is the moral exemplar in the
West, par excellence.
6 For a good introduction to these terms, see WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 4-6 (Eliza-
beth & Monroe Beardsley eds., 2d ed. 1973).
7 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE 104 (1981) (explaining thesis that "moral
utterance... can only be understood as a series of fragmented survivals from an older past").
8 Id.
9 See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABrrs OF THE HEART 50 (1985).
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I. SOCRATES: THE CRTO
The situation in which Socrates found himself at the opening of
Plato's Crito is well-known and can be stated briefly. After a trial on
charges of impiety and of corruption of the youth of Athens, Socrates
was convicted by a jury of his peers and sentenced to death. Plato
told that story in his Apology.10 As the Crito unfolds, we soon dis-
cover that Socrates' good friend, Crito, has invited him to escape his
prison cell and go into exile. Crito assures Socrates that the escape
can be managed easily, at little or no risk to anyone. Moreover, be-
cause the invitation has been extended before and rejected, Crito of-
fers several arguments that he hopes will persuade Socrates to change
his mind and escape.
In the course of his first extended reply to Crito, Socrates makes
some points about his approach to the invitation that bear on the very
nature of the philosophic enterprise that is ethics." First of all, he
says he will not consider efforts to prey upon his emotions. He needs
to be clear-headed and calm. He will listen only to an argument that
is based on the facts of the matter at hand, and "that seems best on
reflection., 12 Second, although he invites dialogue, he will not be
swayed by the opinions of others. He must follow his own con-
science. Third, he says once it is determined what is the right thing or
the best thing to do, he must do it. Summing up this last point Socra-
tes obtains Crito's agreement that "the really important thing is not to
live, but to live well"--that is, "to live honourably and justly."1 3
Although these three points (reason, conscience, and the primacy
of the moral) seem simple enough, they are complex ideas. To be
reasonable does not mean simply to be logical. For the ancients, the
very idea of reason was a normative, not an instrumental idea.14 It
was David Hume in the eighteenth century who turned the ancient
notion on its head by declaring that "reason is... the slave of the pas-
sions."' 5 Nevertheless, we in the modern world can still make sense
of an admonition to think clearly about an issue, and to act on the ba-
sis of reasonable thought, not emotion, though we are leery of the
10 PLATO, The Apology, in THE LAST DAYS OF SOcRATES 29 (Hugh Tredennick & Harold
Tanant trans., Penguin Books 1993) [hereinafter Apology].
I Crito, supra note 1. Although packed into a very short section of the Crito, these pre-
liminary statements are of great use. See FRANKENA, supra note 6, at 2 (discussing Socrates'
dialogue at the beginning of Crito). I am indebted to William Frankena for beginning the
unpacking for me.
12 Crito, supra note 1, at 80.
13 Id. at 83.
14 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994.). Hart reminds us of this point.
15 1 JOHN PLAMENA'IZ, MAN AND SOCIETY 302 (1968) (citing DAVID HUME, A TREATISE
OF HUMAN NATURE (1739)).
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"coldly rational" as well. Again with the ancients, we think reason
must take account of emotion in a serious and realistic way.6 Other-
wise, we are machines and not humans. So if reason is not quite
normative for us, it is surely not quite instrumental either. However
understood in detail, reason is for philosophers and for all who want
to do "ethics," at least the basic coin of the realm.
Conscience, too, is not simply a synonym for naked will.
Traditionally, conscience had to be "informed." A responsible person
had to make a serious investigation into the matter at hand, and
address the arguments on all sides before making a judgment, before
committing the self to a position in tune with the self. 17 It is that
individual self, however, that must decide and commit. "[H]ere I
stand," says Martin Luther, "I cannot do otherwise.','
8
Finally, the moral life is the only life worth living. In fact, it is
the way humans exist and flourish in the world. In Mary Midgley's
words, it is the element in which we exist, like the air we breathe.19
Nothing overrides the moral-not physical comfort, not economic
gain. However conceived, it is the basic tie-breaking point in any
determination of one's action. "What shall I do?" is always, at base, a
moral question.
In reflecting on the primacy of the moral, one further idea needs
to be explicated. Socrates did not differentiate moral duty from moral
aspiration as we modems are want to do.20 For us, obligation is the
moral minimum, beneath which, if we fall, we are subject to justifi-
able criticism or even punishment.2' If we are not subject to an obli-
gation, we claim to be free to decide for ourselves, without further
explanation. One is not blameworthy unless one has failed to fulfill
16 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE THERAPY OF DESIRE 78-101 (1994) (discussing Aris-
totle's view on emotion); L.A. Kosman, Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feeling in Aris-
totle Ethics, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 103, 103-116 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed.,
1980) (analyzing reactions and emotion in moral life). Aristotle is the Greek philosopher who
was most articulate about the place of emotion in the moral life.
17 For a theological statement, see BERNARD HAtING, I THE LAW OF CHRIST 151-54
(Edwin G. Kaiser trans., 1963). For an informed psychological and philosophical study, see
SIDNEY CALLAHAN, IN GOOD CONSCIENCE (1991).
Is Martin Luther, Luther's Reply at the Diet of Worms, in GREAT VOICES OF THE REFOR-
MATION 80 (Harry Emerson Fosdick ed., 1952). There is some question whether Luther ever
uttered the precise words for which he is famously known, though, of course, his identification
with the idea of the primacy of conscience was vitally true about him. See ERIK H. ERIKSON,
YOUNG MAN LUTHER 231 (1958) (noting that this credo may have arisen from legend).
'9 See MARY MIDGLEY, CAN'T WE MAKE MORAL JUDGEMENTS? 10(1991).
20 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5 (1964). The nomenclature contrasting
the morality of "duty" with the morality of "aspiration" seems to have originated with Lon
Fuller. Id. at 5 n.2. He claims the substantive distinction, however, begins with the Greeks. Id.
at 5.
21 See HART, supra note 14, at 180-84, for a succinct summary.
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an obligation.2 Socrates did not think that way. The moral life was
the pursuit of excellence in being human. Socrates surely believed
his decision to be morally "best," though he may or may not have
been obligated to do it. Therefore, his refusal to escape was either an
act of folly, or perhaps, a supererogatory act. For Socrates, however,
the moral life is the via for becoming an excellent person. This is a
"perfectionistic" theory. Whatever one thinks of it as a moral theory,
it at least complicates moral questions. Nevertheless, it is a complica-
tion to which we are heirs. The dichotomy between aspiration and
duty is easy to state, but hard to separate in practice. For example,
what is the nature of the moral issue Dorethea Brooke faces in George
Eliot's Middlemarch? Shall she stay with her limited and neurotic
husband or divorce him to be with a man she truly loves? Certainly
she asked herself wherein lay her duty. She asked simultaneously:
What kind of person am I? and What kind of person do I want to
be?23
In our own time, Lon Fuller showed us how blurred the line be-
tween duty and aspiration could be, when he said:
[O]ur moral vocabulary itself straddles this distinction
and obscures it. Take, for example, the term "value judg-
ment." The concept of value is congenial to a morality of as-
piration. Had we chosen some other companion for it, and
spoken, say, of "the perception of value," we would have had
an expression thoroughly at home in a system of thought di-
rected toward the achievement of human excellence. But in-
stead, we coupled "value" with the term "judgment," an ex-
pression which suggests not a striving toward perfection, but
a conclusion about obligations.24
However we unravel the obligation/aspiration conundrum, it is
clear that for Socrates the moral point of view is equated with the
fully human point of view. In short, the morally appropriate thing to
do overrides all other considerations. And the word Socrates used to
express this position comes down to us in translation as "justice." So
it is that Socrates proceeds, after a brief excursion into fundamentals,
by putting the question at hand in the following way: "[W]e must
consider whether or not it is just for me to try to get away without
2 Presumably it was Kant that set us on this path. See Mary Mothersill, Duty, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 442, 444 (Paul Edwards ed., 1968) ("[t is not clear that any-
one before Kant succeeded in holding in focus the idea of a morality which is not ... dependent
on considerations of prudence.").
23 Such an analysis has contributed to the return to "virtue ethics" among many. See Greg
Pence, Virtue Theory, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 249, 250 (Peter Singer ed., 1993).
24 FULLER, supra note 20, at 13.
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being released by the Athenians?"5 With a rhetorical swipe of the
hand, he dismisses the arguments that Crito originally makes by say-
ing:
As for the considerations you raise about expense,
reputation and bringing up children, I am afraid, Crito, that
these are the concerns of the ordinary public, who think
nothing of putting people to death, and would bring them
back to life if they could, with equal indifference to reason.26
At the end of the dialogue Socrates does address these "worldly"
arguments through the mouth of the Laws or the Naomi,2 7 but for
now, he is trying to wean Crito from the values of ordinary people,
whose concerns are for money, success, or reputation, but not for the
good of the soul. He then puts the question more precisely:
Our real task.., is to consider one question only, the one
which we raised just now: shall we be acting justly in paying
money and showing gratitude to these people who are going
to rescue me, and in escaping or arranging the escape our-
selves, or shall we really be acting unjustly in doing all
this? 8
In answering this question, Socrates articulates two moral princi-
ples upon which the arguments in the Crito largely rest. The first is
one Socrates has made before, notably in the Gorgias.29 It is this:
"[I]t is never right to commit injustice or return injustice or defend
one's self against injury by retaliation." 30 And the second is: One
ought "to fulfil all one's agreements, provided that they are just."31
Socrates was able to get Crito to assent to both these principles in the
abstract, but when Socrates asked his friend if both principles do not
apply in the case at hand, forbidding Socrates to escape, Crito says, "I
can't answer your question, Socrates; I am not clear in my mind.,
32
At this point in the dialogue, Socrates introduces the voice of the
Naomi.33 Scholars vehemently disagree on the significance of the
2 Crito, supra note 1, at 83.
26 Id. at 83.
27 Id. at 90-92.
28 Id. at 83-84.
29 PLATO, GORGIAS (W.C. Helmbold trans., Liberal Arts Press 1952).
30 Crito, supra note 1, at 85.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 In most editions of Plato, Naomi is translated to mean "Laws." For reasons evident in
what follows in the text, I prefer not to use the word "Laws" as a translation for Naomi. Instead
I will retain the word Naomi itself. The word "Laws" immediately calls to mind a more modem
conception, like "command of the sovereign," to use the best-known jurisprudential phrase. See
JOHN AUSTIN, PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (David Campbell & Philip Thomas
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Naomi and the force of her arguments. 34 Many seem to accept the
voice as Socrates' own, and see the interpretive problem as one of
reconciling the Socrates of the Apology with the Socrates of the Crito,
who, through the voice of the Naomi, seems to argue for an absolute
obligation to obey the law.35 The Socrates of the Apology, of course,
told two stories of his own determination not to do something unjust
despite the seeming command of the law, or, at least, of those in au-
thority.36 He also makes a hypothetical statement, in which he says
he would reject an offer of freedom at his trial if conditioned on his
agreement to stop philosophizing.37 Can that Socrates be squared
with the one who will accept death rather than break the law? I side
with the majority who believe that a reconciliation is possible. For
some, however, that reconciliation is possible only because they be-
lieve the voice of the Naomi is not the voice of Socrates.
In a nuanced reading, James Boyd White suggests that the Crito
was not centrally about the question of political obligation at all, but
about Socrates' effort to soothe his friend, Crito, and quell his anxiety
about the Socratic decision to accept his death. For White, the topic
of "obligation to obey the law" is a sidelight to the deeper issue of the
concern Socrates had for his friend, suffering as Crito was because of
the impending death of his old and dear friend, Socrates.38 In a recent
book, Roslyn Weiss goes even further than White. She thinks of Soc-
rates as the great dissenter, one who cares not a whit for the laws or
obedience at all. Her argument is that Socrates' two moral principles,
announced just before the Naomi speak, are to be applied to matters
already discussed rather than to any elaboration yet to come through
the Naomi.39 The first principle-that one should never commit an
injustice, even if one has suffered an injustice-is to be applied to
acts of "paying money and showing gratitude to these people who are
going to rescue me.''4° Bribery is wrong. It consists of paying some-
one not to do his or her official duty. Of course, the jailer's duty is a
eds., Ashgate Publ'g Co. 1998) (1832). Whatever Plato meant by use of the word Naomi, he
did not have in mind the Austinian positivistic idea.
3 Compare R.E. ALLEN, SOCRATES AND LEGAL OBLIGATION (1980), with ROSLYN
WEISS, SOCRATES DiSSATISFIED (1998).
35 ANTHONY D. WOOZLEY, LAW AND OBEDIENCE: THE ARGUMENTS OF PLATO'S CRITo 3
(1979). As one prominent scholar puts it, "[S]ome have thought that it is impossible that both
works should be giving an accurate account of Socrates' views on the individual's duty of obe-
dience to law, on the ground that his position in the one flatly contradicts his position in the
other." Id.
36 Apology, supra note 10, at 56.
37 Id. at 52-53.
38 James Boyd White, Plato's Crito: The Authority of Law and Philosophy, in THE
GREEKS AND US 97 (Robert B. Louden & Paul Schollmeier eds., 1996).
39 See WEIsS, supra note 34, at 73.
40 Crito, supra note 1, at 83.
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legal one-and so, presumably, is the duty of the rescuers "not to res-
cue" also a legal duty. If it is a moral duty, it is one precisely because
it is a legal duty. This Weiss fails to see. In any event, there is noth-
ing internal to the dialogue that suggests Socrates was referring only
to his preceding arguments, and not, at least in some significant way,
to the arguments that now follow through the speeches of the Naomi.
Weiss' second point is that Socrates' principle that one should
fulfill all one's agreements if they are just should be read to refer to
his remarks in the Apology after the death sentence has been pro-
nounced.41 In referring to his accusers, Socrates says: "When I leave
this court I shall go away condemned by you to death, but they will
go away convicted by Truth herself of depravity and injustice. And
they accept their sentence even as I accept mine.' '42 This is hardly an
agreement, and surely not one about justice. Heavy with Socratic
irony, would it not be more reasonable to interpret these lines as a
refusal to accept the sentence as just, because produced by wicked
people? In any event, again, we have the argument made by Weiss
but not by Socrates in the Crito. Weiss assumes Socrates made his
strongest arguments against escape to the middling intellect, Crito,
without even alluding to their application. It may be so, but it is not
very likely. Nevertheless, these examples show that critics are often
puzzled by the arguments the Naomi make, convinced that Socrates
could not be speaking in his own unequivocal voice when the Naomi
make claims of obedience to the laws of Athens which seem so abso-
lute. Indeed, White calls the basic arguments of the Naomi "very
weak indeed." 43
I do not agree. Before looking at those arguments, however, I
want to take a step backward and review what Socrates actually did,
both in the Crito and as reported by him in the Apology. This is to
remind the reader of a good Aristotelian point. Ethics are an attempt
to theorize about the good actions of a good person.44 So what Socra-
tes does is always of importance. By this statement I do not mean to
minimize the arguments Socrates makes in justifying his actions, nor
to divorce argument entirely from action. However, I do want to re-
mind the reader that we often "do better than we say."45 Remember,
Huckleberry Finn does not tell Jim's owner where Jim is even though
41 See WEISS, supra note 34, at 74-75.
42 Crito, supra note I, at 64.
43 White, supra note 38, at 97.
44 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 65 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett Publ'g Co.
1985) [hereinafter NICOMACHEAN ETHICS].
45 This remark is a reminder to those who read case law in the common law tradition. It is
clear that the decision based on the relevant facts counts as the kernel of what is the law of the
case, rather than what the judge might say about his or her reasons for deciding the case the way
it was decided. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1949).
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Huck believes what he is doing is a "si" that will condemn him to
hell.46 Huck was a good person; but his thinking processes were not
always logical.
In the Apology, Socrates proclaims that he "would never submit
wrongly to any authority through fear of death, but would refuse at
any cost-even that of my life."47 He makes this statement in ex-
plaining why he chose to live the "private life and leave politics
alone."'48 His first example comes from the only time he held public
office. As a member of the council, he was the sole member of the
executive who opposed trying together the "ten commanders who had
failed to rescue the men who were lost in the naval engagement."
49
Trying them "en bloc" was illegal, Socrates maintained, "as you all
recognized later."50 Although he was denounced and almost arrested,
he "thought that it was my duty to face it out on the side of law and
justice rather than support you, through fear of prison or death, in
your wrong decision." 51 This happened in the old democracy. His
second example occurred when the oligarchy came to power. He was
ordered "to go and fetch Leon of Salamis from his home for execu-
tion., 52 To Socrates this was done as a ruse, "their object being to
implicate as many people as possible in their crimes." 53 When others
similarly summoned went to arrest Leon, Socrates went home. He
maintains that he would have been sentenced to death for this refusal
had the government not fallen soon afterwards. 54
On the basis of these two stories, it is easy to see why Socrates is
the champion of those who prefer to die rather than perform an unjust
act. On the other hand, it could be argued that these two stories also
prove Socrates was preeminently a law-abiding citizen. In the first
case he simply voted against doing something that "later" everyone
acknowledged was "illegal." In the second case, democrats may have
believed that all the acts of the oligarchy were illegal.55 So, arguably,
Socrates would not act either unjustly or illegally in either case. Nev-
ertheless, these stories suggest Socrates was not a law-abiding abso-
lutist; therefore, the Socrates of the Crito is acting inconsistently with
the Socrates of the Apology. 56 It is at least the case that Socrates
46 MARKTwAIN, ADVENTURES oFHUCKLEBERRYFINN 207 (Penguin Books 1983).









56 See White, supra note 38, at 98-99.
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would defy lawful authority, which, arguably, is tantamount to dis-
obedience to law.
The third example of the Socratic attitude toward the law comes
earlier in the Apology, when he says he would not stop philosophizing
even if it were made a condition of his acquittal.57 Of course, it is not
clear that such an offer would have been legal, even if made. Never-
theless, it does show an adamantine sense of self, as one specially
called by God to perform a role. I think it not far-fetched to argue
that Socrates would defy a law forbidding him to teach. In older par-
lance, it would be said that Socrates was deeply committed to his vo-
cation as teacher and gadfly58 to his fellow Athenian citizens. I want
to make something of this later, but before doing so, it is necessary to
add the "act" of Socrates in the Crito to the list of acts to be consid-
ered in determining his ethical stance before the law. So far, the ex-
amples given are ambiguous, except they suggest that Socrates would
not accept any authoritative order that required him to do something
that he considered wrong to do, including silencing him. The situa-
tion in the Crito is significantly different.
Socrates had been condemned to death by a jury of his peers in a
trial that was conducted in accordance with Athenian law. Impris-
oned, he refused to escape, although the means were clearly at hand.
Instead, he chose to accept the sentence of death, even though he
thought his conviction and the sentence were unjust to him. It is this
act--or refusal to act-that presents the central ethical issue. He
determined he must not act contrary to the decision of the Athenian
court that convicted him and sentenced him to death.
Why did Socrates refuse to escape? The critics are deeply di-
vided on the real reasons. Writing in Plato's time, Xenophon thought
Socrates was simply ready to die and chose this unorthodox judicial
suicide as the handy method to do so. 59 Few agree with that extreme
notion; but there have been serious scholarly efforts to explain his
decision that range from capitulation to authority to paradoxical defi-
ance. Most, however, have tried to work through the arguments given
by the Naomi, assuming that they flesh out the application of the two
principles Socrates announced early on in the Crito, as his basic rea-
sons. Although mentioned before, I will now name them as: (1) the
argument from injury; and (2) the argument from agreement. I be-
lieve they take us far in explaining Socrates' choice, but perhaps not
57 Crito, supra note 1, at 53.
58 See Apology, supra note 10. As Socrates says: "God has assigned me to this city, as if
to a large thoroughbred horse which because of its great size is inclined to be lazy and needs the
stimulation of some stinging fly." Id. at 54.
59 XENOPHON, Socrates Defense, in CONVERSATIONS OF SOCRATES 49 (Robin Waterfield
ed., Hugh Tredennick & Robin Waterfield trans., Penguin Books 1990).
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all the way. After examining the arguments from injury and agree-
ment, I will look at another category of argument, which I will call
the argument from identity. I will also look at the "wordly" argu-
ments Socrates refutes from a very practical point of view. Both law-
yers and philosophers like to see what constitutes the "necessary and
sufficient" conditions that will support a decision. It behooves us,
however, to try to set those arguments into a real life context, where
other factors, indeed, other arguments, are taken into account by the
decision-maker.
A. The Argument from Injury
The Socratic principle, "[it is never right to commit injustice or
return injustice or defend one's self against injury by retaliation," ° is
partly tautological. In short it may mean it is never right to do wrong.
It is also, however, a substantive moral claim. R. E. Allen argues this
substance can be understood by comparing it to two separate distinc-
tions: (1) between injury and harm as clarified historically by their
use in the common law; and (2) between retribution and rehabilitation
as justifications for punishment under modern notions of the criminal
law. 61 Allen puts the first point this way, tracing the words etymol-
ogically under the common law:
Harm is Old English, and implies evil done or suffered.
Damage derives through Norman French from Latin dam-
num, meaning any sort of hurt, harm, or loss. Injury, on the
other hand, derives from injuria, which in turn derives from
in jus, contrary to law or right. Thus at common law, certain
harms are dismissed as damna sine injuria, losses which the
law will refuse to shift and rather let lie where they fall.62
It is for Socrates, therefore, not harm that cannot be rendered to
another, but an injustice or an injury, i.e., "wrongful harm." So far,
this is just linguistic clarity. What pushes it into a substantive claim
is the assertion that Socrates rejects "retribution" as a false theory of
justice. The retributivist connects justice with debt. If a person does
wrong, he or she owes someone something. The discharge can only
take place when the debt is settled, by paying it back. This backward
looking theory is replaced by a forward looking theory, which says
that punishment is justified only by making the wrong-doer better, by
improving the excellence of that person. Thus all action must be for
the good of one's own soul and the souls of others. The criminal act
60 Crito, supra note 1, at 85.
61 See ALLEN, supra note 34, at 77-81.
62 Id. at 76-77.
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is only the triggering mechanism allowing the State to adjudicate. Of
course, this does not mean that a person may not be harmed (i.e., by
imprisonment or even by death). A person may be so harmed, but not
because the harm satisfies the debt. The harm is like medicine for the
body; its aim is to cure. Clearly, Socrates believed that the purpose of
punishment was to "rehabilitate" or "reform" the criminal, to increase
the person's virtue and send him or her back into the community a
better citizen. Thus, transported from the criminal law analogy, the
substantive claim of the Socratic principle under examination is: One
ought never so act as to diminish human excellence in oneself or in
another. Thus, one should never do anything that injures another, just
as one should constantly be doing all he or she can to live one's own
life more virtuously. This is not quite the teaching of Jesus-love
your enemies, do good to those who hate you6 -but it is a huge
moral leap from the Greek popular moral assumption, that one should
help one's friends and harm one's enemies. 64
Central as the "do no injury" principle is for Socrates, when it is
applied in the context of the argument of the Naomi, it gathers even
more power because of who the Naomi are, what they represent, and
how Socrates himself is related to them. The argument initially takes
the form of a powerful rhetorical question from the Naomi:
Now, Socrates, what are you proposing to do? Can you
deny that by this act which you are contemplating you intend,
so far as you have the power, to destroy us, the Laws, and the
whole State as well? Do you imagine that a city can continue
to exist and not be turned upside down, if the legal judge-
ments which are pronounced in it have no force but are nulli-
fied and destroyed by private persons? 65
On the face of it, the question could be read as arguing that break-
ing any law is equivalent to a wholesale assault on all the laws of the
State and the State itself. In context, however, and as clarified by the
third part of the question as asked, the precise equivalency is that a
wholesale assault is made upon the State itself by attempting to sub-
vert judgments judicially rendered. That is the way Allen reads the
question, although others have read it more broadly, implying that the
Naomi argues that all laws must be obeyed. 66 Acknowledging that
later the Naomi does seem to demand that all laws are to be obeyed,
63 See Luke 27:38; see also ALLEN, supra note 34, at 77 (discussing Socrates' views on
retribution).
64 See MARY WHITLOCK BLUNDELL, HELPING FRIENDS AND HARMING ENEMIES (1989).
65 Crito, supra note 1, at 86.
66 ALLEN, supra note 34, at 86 ("The Laws of Athens, as characters in the dialogue, de-
mand obedience to all laws.").
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Allen suggests that in a foundational sense, because the argument
goes to the very destruction of the legal order, it is best to understand
the claim as meaning "there is a duty either to obey all laws, or to
accept the legal consequences of disobedience when imposed by a
court, and even, as in Socrates' case, to accept those consequences
when there has in fact been no disobedience." 67 Remember in the
Apology, Socrates seems to claim that the duty to obey is not uncondi-
tional; in the Crito, the citizen is admonished either to do what the
law determines or else persuade it that justice is on his or her side.68
Presumably, the place to persuade is in a court of law. Moreover,
Allen claims that the "fundamental duty imposed by the legal order is
not blind obedience to each of its rules-some of which, after all,
may be unjust-but of fidelity to the legal order itself."69 But Allen
does argue that obedience to unjust judicial determinations is re-
quired, so why not obedience to unjust primary laws? Presumably
because that may entail doing an injustice, which, for Socrates is ab-
solutely prohibited. But if not? If to obey the primary law is merely
to suffer an injustice, why would it not be similarly Socratic to obey
under that circumstance? Or is one only obliged to suffer injustice
when the alterative is to do an injustice? What is at issue here? Who
or what exactly is it that Socrates or any citizen injures when he or
she breaks a law? Or are we talking not about injury but about harm
(to continue the distinction Allen makes)? For this exploration, we
must examine the meaning of the personification of the Naomi in the
Crito.
Allen argues that the personification of the laws "answers to an
assumption in legal ontology., 70 He explains in this way: "State-
ments about a legal order cannot be analyzed without remainder into
sets of statements about individual human beings, any more than
statements about that creature of law, the corporation, can be ana-
lyzed without remainder into sets of statements about its members.'
This is to conceive the laws and the State as a juridical person. Thus,
disobedience tends to the destruction of the State itself. That is a
huge claim. Allen defends the claim not by suggesting that the breach
of a given law may, in fact, tend to the destruction of the State; but
ingeniously, by tying court judgments to authority generally, then by
universalizing the argument to mean "if this judgment as judicially
rendered is not authoritative, then no judgment as judicially rendered
67 Id.
68 Crito, supra note 1, at 87.
69 ALLEN, supra note 34, at 86.
70 Id.at8l.
71 Id. at 81-82.
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is authoritative., 72 It is as if a single breach of the law is equivalent to
an attack on legal validity or authority, and on the legitimacy of the
State itself. Maybe this is so; but what does this do to "unjust laws"?
Must they also be obeyed in order to preserve the State? Possibly,
though the evidence from the Apology is not clear. Still, the possibil-
ity is perhaps why Allen narrows the question to disobedience of a
judicial determination, not to disobedience of any law. For obeying a
judicial determination cannot harm one's soul nor the soul of others-
clearly a Socratic concern; while obeying some unjust decree or other
may cause you to commit an injustice, as arresting Leon would have
been-clearly a Socratic concern as well. The result of Allen's read-
ing is a reasonable interpretation of the text; moreover, it is com-
pletely consistent with Socratic principles. It seems, generally, to be
the best reading of the Crito; but that is partly the case because of the
way that interpretation fits into the second of the two basic Socratic
principles, i.e., the principle that we must fulfill all just agreements.
B. The Argument from Agreement
Still to be assessed is the response to the problem of the State's
injustice to Socrates, "by passing a faulty judgement at [his] trial. 73
The Naomi brushes that objection aside by moving to the "agree-
ment" part of the argument. "Was there provision for this in the
agreement between you and us, Socrates? Or did you undertake to
abide by whatever judgements the State pronounced?" 74 This particu-
lar question ushers into western thought the complex and much dis-
cussed theory of "consent," 75 although to take up that issue here
would lead us too far afield. Rather, let us look at the agreement is-
sue as Socrates did.
First of all, the State is a juridical person. It cannot be "analyzed
without remainder into sets of statements about individual human be-
ings."76 It is more than the sum total of its citizens at any given time.
Agreed. Nevertheless, it is at least partly those citizens as human be-
ings who may be harmed or benefited by an individual's acts. Pre-
sumably the harm in disobedience is a weakening of the ties that bind
the individuals together into a community. There are two moral
points tied to this. First, one person's disobedience pulls the ship of
State (if only marginally) off course. While the rest of us are heading
72 Id. at 85.
73 Crito, supra note 1, at 86.
74 Id.
75 "Consent" blossomed with the classic Social Contract Theorists, Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau. For a modem statement, see Joseph Raz, Authority and Consent, 67 VA. L. REV. 103
(1981).
76 ALLEN, supra note 34, at 82.
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in one direction, that consistent with the law, the law-breaker is work-
ing against movement in that direction. Depending on the contents of
the law involved, our collective efforts are thwarted, perhaps seri-
ously, perhaps not. Still, there is some discord, some damage in
every case. The second point is seen most clearly in what has been
called the duty of fair play.7 In any cooperative scheme, one's duty
is to do what others are bound to do when your turn comes. Paying
taxes is the duty of all, not necessarily because it affects the amount
in the coffers all that much, but because it is not fair to other taxpay-
ers for anyone to get a "free ride." Moreover, law breaking breeds
resentment on the part of those who are law-abiding. Worse, it may
breed cynicism and it may breed imitation. "If they can get away
with it, so can I." Still, what if the law is unjust? If it pulls citizens
away from injustice, maybe breaking the law is not such a bad thing
at all. It may, in fact, be the first step on the road to justice. Never-
theless, there will be resentment among those who do not see the in-
justice or believe disobedience is not the way to make the world more
just. Fair play still has its bite here. Others may follow suit, creating
chaos, rather than a more just order. So disobeying cuts both ways.
Clearly if the unjust law makes you commit a wrong, then according
to good Socratic principles, you must disobey; but if the law is unjust,
and does not make you commit an injustice, perhaps you still would
be justified in disobeying. However, it is clear that Socrates would
not want to lead others to corrupt behavior. That would be scandal.
So at the very least, Socrates might argue that it is better to "suffer an
injustice" (obey an unjust law or unjust judicial determination) rather
than lead others astray or create a situation where more harm than
good may occur. This, in fact, was the formulation of the obligation,78
as worked out by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. One
has a duty to obey just laws because authority is necessary for both
justice and good order, but no duty to obey unjust laws exists, except
if scandal would thereby be given or if the action would cause great
civic disturbance;79 for it is better to suffer a wrong than to commit a
wrong. Moreover, for Aquinas and for Socrates, the State can never
force you to commit a moral wrong.
80
77 H.L.A. Hart and John Rawls are credited with the formulation of this position. See
H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights? 64 PHIL REv. 175, 185 (1955); John Rawls, Legal
Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964).
78 THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ONLAW 95-98 (Regnery Publ'g, Inc. 1956).
79 Id. at 97.
90 lId ("[L]aws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good ... and laws of
this kind must nowise be observed."). See also Crito, supra note 1, at 84 ("[Inn no circum-
stances must one do wrong").
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I believe the substance of this argument can be found in the Crito,
although it took until the Middle Ages for a coherent theory to be de-
veloped. Nevertheless, that theory can explain the behavior of Socra-
tes and is consistent with his accepted principles. Before explicating
the Thomist theory, however, it is useful to return to the arguments of
the Naomi regarding the "agreement" referred to by Socrates; for it is
those arguments that scholars have historically considered, attacked,
and been puzzled by. The argument from "injury" for Socrates in the
Crito is connected inextricably to the argument from agreement.
However, in order to understand the argument from agreement, it is
necessary first to separate out and examine the following questions:
What is the nature of the agreement that binds Socrates, and with
whom was it made? Who would have been harmed by Socrates' es-
cape? Would the harm have amounted to a wrongful injury, an injus-
tice, and, therefore, a wrong under the Socratic principle: "[It is
never right to commit injustice or return injustice or defend one's self
against injury by retaliation"? 81
In examining the nature of the agreement, the first thing to under-
stand is that the agreement is nothing like a Social Contract, at least
of the kind made famous in western thought by Hobbes, Locke, Rous-
82
seau, and Kant. Plato had Glaucon in the Republic mouth those
kinds of arguments.83 They were rejected by Socrates then; and they
would be rejected by Socratic thinkers today, even in John Rawls'
sophisticated neo-Kantian version.84 This is because the premise for
all Social Contract theories is at variance with the Socratic under-
standing of the nature of political society. Social Contracterians
claim there is a pre-societal State of Nature. Individuals, qua indi-
viduals, then come together-actually or metaphorically-to agree on
the formation of a formal state. The nature of the agreement differs
from philosopher to philosopher, even as to who is bound by the con-
tract and why it differs as well. 85 For Socrates, however, these details
would be irrelevant. He simply would not accept the existence of
individuals in a State of Nature, period. As Aquinas, following Aris-
totle, later put it, by nature, human beings are political and social
animals.86
81 See Crito, supra note 1, at 85.
82 Raz, supra note 75.
83 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 89-90 (H.D.P. Lee trans., Penguin Books 1955).
84 See RAWLS, supra note 2.
85 Famously, Hobbes claims the State is not a party, while Locke claims it is.
86 A.P. D'Entreves, Introduction to AQUINAS: SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS xv (J.G.
Dawson trans., Basil Blackwell 1965) (translating as "homo naturaliter est animal politicum et
sociale.").
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The key lies in understanding the difference between a political
community and what we call in the modem world, a sovereign state.
For Socrates, there is no such thing as an individual without a com-
munity whence he or she sprang. In Jacques Maritain's formulation,
the political community or Body Politic "is the most perfect of tempo-
ral societies," 87 and it exists necessarily and reasonably for the com-
mon good of all who comprise it. "Justice is a primary condition for
the existence of the body politic," Maritain continues, "but Friendship
is its very life-giving form. 88 Again, it was Aristotle who articulated
both the naturalness and inevitability of "self-sufficient" political
communities. 89 For Maritain, working self-consciously in the Aristo-
telian-Thomist tradition, the body politic is the whole of the commu-
nity which nurtures each citizen, and to which the individual is bound
by countless ties of gratitude and affection. The State, on the other
hand, is simply a part of this political community, the part "especially
concerned with the maintenance of law, the promotion of the common
welfare and public order, and the administration of public affairs.
The State is a part which specializes in the interests of the whole." 9
Finally, "The human person as an individual is for the body politic
and the body politic is for the human person as a person. But man is
by no means for the State. The State is for man."91 So the crucial
idea is that Socrates owes fidelity not to the abstraction that is the
State, not even to the laws passed by the State, as such, but to the po-
litical community, the whole of the assemblage of people, and the
people's traditions and mores and institutions, including, of course,
the State and its laws.
Thus, the first argument that the Naomi make against Socrates'
hypothetical claim that he may escape because "the State is guilty of
an injustice against me . . . by passing a faulty judgement at my
trial '92 is not merely an appeal to the formal laws that enabled him to
grow up well in Athens. Instead, the Naomi draw an analogy be-
tween those laws and the protection, education and nurturing of his
parents-the first to whom we all owe natural duties-and argue,
"compared with your mother and father and all the rest of your ances-
tors your country is something far more precious, more venerable,
more sacred, and held in greater honor both among gods and among
87 JACQUEs MAR1TAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 10 (1951).
88 Id.
89 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 27-28 (Betty Radice ed., T.A. Sinclair trans., Penguin Books
1962) (arguing that self-sufficiency begins as a means for securing life, but ultimately serves the
ends of the State, a "perfectly natural form of association," by positioning it to secure the "good
life").
90 MARITAIN, supra note 87, at 12.
91 Id. at 13.
92 Crito, supra note 1, at 86.
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all reasonable men." 93 Although translations differ, in the much re-
spected Tredennick-Tarrant version of the Crito Socrates introduces
the Naomi into the dialogue in the following manner: "Suppose that
while we were preparing to run away from here... the Laws and
communal interest of Athens were to come and confront us with this
question: 'Now, Socrates, what are you proposing to do? Can you
deny that by this act which you are contemplating you intend, so far
as you have the power, to destroy us, the Laws, and the whole State as
well?"
94
Although the Laws themselves are personified, they are not sim-
ply the animated formal rules of the state. They are statutes, institu-
tions, and, importantly, the customs of the people; they are parents,
relatives, and ancestors, too; and they are fellow citizens. They are,
in short, the "communal interests" of the city-state that is Athens.
Strictly, then, a law is only the formal rule of the city, the place where
all the accumulated interconnections between and among peoples,
traditions, and beliefs authoritatively come together. The agreement,
in the first place, is between Socrates and the people of Athens, un-
derstood as existing over time, and as having values articulated in
custom and statute and embedded in institutions and tradition. The
communal interests have given Socrates so much, have contributed so
much to his very identity, that, short of requiring him to damage his
own soul or those of particular others, he is bound in fidelity to those
countless others and myriad ties to at least not strike a blow against
them by, in this case, defying the law. It would be worse than doing
violence to one's own parents. This is why the argument from
agreement slides so quickly and easily in the Crito to what modems
have tried to make out as an independent ground of political obliga-
tion-gratitude.95 The analogy of child to parent with citizen to state
is a way of explicating the very foundation of the agreement between
Socrates and the communal interests of Athens.
The above would be enough to bind Socrates as it binds all Athe-
nians; but there is more. In addition to this communal covenant, Soc-
rates has also implicitly agreed to be bound by the laws. Athens al-
lows a citizen to take his property and leave whenever he likes. Soc-
rates has not only stayed, he has expressed satisfaction with Athens
by not even leaving the city temporarily, except at the State's behest
to fights in its wars, and on one other occasion-to attend a festival.
96
93 Id. at 87.
94 Id. at 86.
95 See JOEL FEINBERG, Civil Disobedience in the Modern World, in FREEDOM AND FUL-
FILLMENT 152, 161 (1992) (listing "gratitude" as one of several possible independent, though
derivative, grounds upon which an obligation to obey the law may be based).
96 Crito, supra note 1, at 89.
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The most telling display of Socratic assent to remain a faithful citizen
of Athens came at the trial itself, when Socrates could have proposed
banishment as a penalty, but instead proclaimed that he preferred
death to banishment. 97 The full power of the argument is captured by
the Naomi when it says that escape will show no respect for his own
earlier "profession[l, and no regard for us, the Laws, whom you are
trying to destroy; you are behaving like the lowest slave, trying to run
away in spite of the contracts and undertakings by which you agreed
to act as a member of our State."
98
In the end Socrates is reminded that if a wrong was done to him,
it was "not done by us, the Laws, but by your fellow-men." 99 Techni-
cally speaking, Socrates had no objection to the laws of Athens. The
laws were not unjust. Laws, however, are not self-executing. They
must be interpreted and enforced by those who are in authority. It is
sometimes possible to separate the two. When it was decided to try
the ten admirals together, Socrates voted against the decision because
it was contrary to "law and justice."1°° Here it is possible to say the
law and the decision-makers were different. In practice, however, it
is not always easy to make this distinction; even if it can be made, it
may make no moral difference. In the case of his escape from prison,
Socrates could not simply respond to his "fellow-man" who had
wronged him. He would have had to violate the law. At the end of
the Crito it was thus perfectly correct for the Naomi to claim that the
injury he would be inflicting would be on "those whom you least
ought to injure-yourself, your friends, your country, and us" (the
laws). 101
C. The Argument from Identity
Naomi's charges concerning Socrates' personal behavior regard-
ing consent and his refusal to suggest banishment as punishment at
his trial take us into the heart of the way a person's identity enters
into any assessment of their behavior. We must now go beyond the
two explicit arguments Socrates puts forth. We- must now remind
ourselves that the Apology was Socrates' defense of the way he lived
his life. The Crito is a continuation of that defense. These two are
also dialogues of self-revelation. They are profoundly about the very
identity and character of the man himself. Who was he?
971,L
93 Id.
99 Id. at 91.
100 Apology, supra note 10, at 56.
101 Crito, supra note 1, at 91.
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Socrates was teacher, philosopher, and gadfly. These three are
one thing to him. He was also husband, father, and friend; impor-
tantly, he was a citizen of Athens. It is as citizen that we see him
most clearly, but he was not just an ordinary citizen. Within that role,
he self-identified as one who had a special mission. How shall we
understand the vocation that was uniquely Socratic? To begin with,
he was sent by God to Athens to perform the task of awakening his
fellow citizens from their ignorance and lethargy. 1°2 He had been
called like an Old Testament prophet to set their thoughts on the
good. 103 At his trial he asks if the jury could doubt that he had "been
sent to this city as a gift from God," given his neglect of his own af-
fairs, his humiliation in "allowing my family to be neglected," and his
utter poverty. 1°4 Unlike the Sophists, he takes no fee for the good ad-
vice he gives. He does not even enjoy it. He has simply been given
this unique vocation by God. It makes no sense to behave as he does
unless he has been given a divine mission. He believes that this is so.
Moreover, from childhood he has been visited at crucial moments in
his life by a daimonion, who "dissuades me from what I am proposing
to do."' 05 Although the daimonion may be thought of as the voice of
conscience, Socrates himself thought this experience "supernatural."
In the Republic, Socrates says: "Before me... I doubt if anyone was
ever favored by a warning voice of this kind." 1°6 Surely, he himself
believed it to be unique, indeed, of divine origin.
In a non-believing age, this talk of vocation and of hearing the
voice of a god is apt to be translated into something non-religious or
passed over completely in awkward silence. I do not do so because
Socrates considered these matters inseparable from his sense of self.
To have escaped from prison would have been to deny his vocation
and to defy God himself.
However, I suggest that an apt comparison in today's secular
world would be to one's professional identity. Roscoe Pound called a
profession "a group of [persons] pursuing a learned art as a common
calling in the spirit of public service." 1°7 Historically doctors, law-
102 See Apology, supra note 10, at 54 (stating that Socrates was sent as a "stinging fly" to
keep Athenians from moral idleness).
103 See ABRAHAM J. HESCHEL, THE PROPHETS 20-21 (1962) ("The prophet is a watchman
(Hos. 9:8), a servant (Amos 3:7; Jer. 25:4; 26:5), a messenger of God (Hag. 1:13), 'an assayer
and tester' of the people's ways (Jer. 6:27); 'whenever you hear a word from my mouth, you
shall give them warning from Me' (Ezek. 3:17).").
104 Apology, supra note 10, at 54-55.
1o5 Id. at 55.
106 KARL JASPERS, SOCRATES, BUDDHA, CONFUCIUS, JESUS 11 (Hannah Arendt ed., Ralph
Manheim trans., Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1957).
107 ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).
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yers, teachers, and the clergy constituted the four great professions. 08
Socrates' "calling" may seem too idiosyncratic to fit that definition.
Indeed, all callings seem unique to the one called, yet they often can
be seen as fitting a larger pattern. A doctor's decision to stay and
help during an epidemic; 1°9 the witness to a person's commitment to
religious faith in the face of martyrdom; 110 a lawyer risking all to ar-
gue on behalf of an unpopular client1 1 1-these professional stances
compare nicely with the decision of Socrates to remain who he was to
the end. Moreover, these professional identities are always integral to
the personality of the professional.
Even the final "worldly" arguments of the Naomi fit together
consistently with the Socratic argument from identity. Earlier, in his
first response to Crito's arguments, Socrates had demonstrated that
the issue of "what others will think' is irrelevant to the task of pursu-
ing the good.112  Now, the Naomi quickly disposes of the other
"worldly" arguments. First, harm will come to his rescuers. They
risk "being banished and either losing their citizenship or having their
property confiscated."'1 3  Socrates is always concerned about the
good of others. This would not be a good result. Secondly, where
would he go? A well-governed state would eye him with suspicion,
thinking he was a "destroyer of laws."114 To go to a disorderly state
would not be good for his own soul, living "as the toady and slave of
all the populace." 1 5 Moreover, no matter where he goes, it would not
be best for his children either. He counts on Athens to do well b6
them, and his friends will especially care for them after he is gone."I
Tucked into these arguments, too, is a plain fact of life: Socrates is
seventy years old. There is not time to start again. It would be fool-
ish for him to "cling so greedily to life''117 with not much more natural
108 jd.
109 See Matthew K Wynla et al., Medical Professionalism in Society, 341 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1612, 1613 (1999) (arguing that heroism is a commonplace of the physician's obligation,
as it, perhaps, has been since the seventeenth century). See generally Harold J. Cook, History of
Medical Ethics, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1537 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995).
110 PETER AcKRoYD, THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORE 400, 405 (1998) (noting that although
More famously died "the King's good servant but God's first," i.e., for his faith, he also fought
for his life as a consummate professional lawyer).
M Morris L. Ernst & Alan V. Schwartz, The Right to Counsel and The Unpopular Cause,
20 U. PrrT. L. REV. 727, 728 (1959) (emphasizing the need to restore substance to the right to
counsel, and discussing negative impacts that limiting the right in practice have had on clients,
attorneys, and the legal system as a whole). John Adams felt the sting of public outrage when
he decided to represent a British captain and his soldiers for firing on colonialists during the
infamous Boston massacre. Id. at 728.
112 Crito, supra note, 1 at 81.




17 Id. at 90-91.
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time to go anyway. Finally, the Naomi argue that the Supreme Jus-
tice in the universe awaiting him in the "next world" would not look
favorably on a man who acts so dishonorably as to escape in the
circumstances in which Socrates found himself.118 Of course, in the
Phaedo, Socrates elaborates on his belief that the soul is immortal,11 9
and although not altogether certain of the way it will exist in the after-
life, Socrates is sure that he will receive a "kindly welcome" there. 120
In the end then, both the pragmatic and other-worldly considera-
tions line up agreeably with the moral ones, and all enfold neatly into
the Socratic identity. He was philosopher, teacher, and gadfly; he
was also citizen par excellence. As the famous ending of the Phaedo
has it, Socrates was the bravest, wisest, and most just of all men. 121
Superlatives aside, since his death-and partly because of the way he
died-Socrates has been one of the supreme moral exemplars in the
history of western civilization. 122 The steadfastness of his personality
and his principles in obeying the law leading to his own death have
had much to do with this historic assessment. Indeed, it is not super-
fluous to add that it would have been "scandalous" for Socrates to
escape. I believe it is self-evident that we admire him because he
stayed. He taught us something by his refusal to escape, by his ad-
herence to law in the face of death. What he taught was not blind
obedience to law, but how to live and die a "good" man.
D. Political Obligation: Socrates and Aquinas
To have worked through the Apology and the Crito is to see how
argument and action work together in a good person's life. Still, there
is always a yearning to distill the essence of the moral activity, to es-
tablish an ethical principle or set of principles that may help others
through their own moral dilemmas. That is what Aristotle did in writ-
ing the first philosophical text on ethics that we have in the West,
though he reminded us, even as he began, that all we can do is to "in-
dicate the truth roughly and in outline."'1 3 So, in outline form, here is
the Socratic Theory of political obligation. Generally, Socrates
thought there was a very strong obligation to obey the law based pri-
marily on the interrelationship between and among his three princi-
ples: injury, agreement, and identity. They do flow together. Clearly
he believed violation of law injured the people of the community in
118 Id. at 91.
119 See PLATO, Phaedo, in THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES 93 (Hugh Tredennick & Harold
Tarrant trans., Penguin Books 1993) [hereinafter Phaedo].
120 Crito, supra note 1, at 91.
121 Phaedo, supra note 119, at 185.
122 See JASPERS, supra note 106, at 17-21.
123 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 44, at 20.
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myriad ways. Law-breaking is an assault upon authority, so neces-
sary for peace, good order, and virtue. Citizens do consent to obey
the law, understood as an implied and quite natural obligation owed
to others as part of a functioning community. Gratitude is also due
the community, which has done so much to shape the citizen to be
who he or she is. As opposed to recent concern in political and legal
theory,' 24 the ancients did not much worry about the ground of the
obligation. That would have largely been assumed. The real question
was disobedience. How could that be justified? Of course the two
are interconnected. The assumption that there is a prima facie obliga-
tion to obey the law still provides the starting point in many discus-
sions of political obligation.1l 5 Civil disobedience, for example,
would be a much different idea without such an assumption. Never-
theless, recent concerns are less about the moral justification of dis-
obedience than about the basis of the obligation to obey in the first
place. It was otherwise for Socrates. The lesson of both the Apology
and the Crito is straightforward; namely, there is an overriding obli-
gation to obey the law, except in circumstances where the law would
require one to commit an unjust act against another or to fail to per-
form an obligation one is morally bound to perform. That is the sum
and substance of it.
When Aquinas came to theorize about the same subject, he incor-
porated much of the Socratic doctrine, but added several features.
Aquinas' theory comes in that part of the Summa Theologica, famil-
iarly known as his Treatise on Law.126 Best known as the place to
look for the most sophisticated version of natural law ever produced,
the Treatise also treated political obligation in a sophisticated matter,
but, unlike his natural law theory, Aquinas' theory of obligation to
law is largely ignored today.127 This might be because secular theo-
rists believe it to be so tied to Thomist theology that it cannot be use-
ful in non-theological discussions. I think that is not the case and
with some changes in vocabulary, I believe the theory can be under-
stood and applied whenever and however the issue of political obliga-
tion arises. Let me sketch the theory now without relying on theol-
ogy.
First, the only ground for the obligation to obey mentioned in the
Treatise is "authority." The most persuasive argument for the moral
underpinning of "authority" as the basis for political obligation is the
124 See DTY TO OBEY, supra note 3 (collection of essays exploring the existence and basis
of the obligation to obey the law).
125 Id.
126 See AQUINAS, supra note 78.
127 For example, there is no mention of it in DUTY TO OBEY, supra note 3. Moreover,
there are no selections from any neo-Thomist philosopher, such as John Finnis, either.
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natural need for it. 128 In any group there is a need for coordination.
This can be achieved through unanimity or authority. There is no
third way.129 This is particularly true of large groups in need of a va-
riety of things. No matter how you conceive the full range of needs in
a political group, the need for coordination is a deep-seated one.
Surely this extends from the important, though mundane, matter of
traffic flow and control, to the fundamental subject of protection from
physical harm. Different people will have different solutions to coor-
dination problems. So long as those in authority choose reasonable
solutions, it follows that there is an obligation to abide by those
choices. Thus, there is scarcely a need to argue the obligation to obey
"just laws," for "just laws" are at least that category of reasonable
solutions to coordination problems that a given moral agent will iden-
tify and defend. I am trying here to be as neutral as possible on what
that word "just" may mean in a given context. The burden of this
essay is to try to look at concrete situations and tease out the moral
implications of choices made. In any event, Aquinas posited the
moral obligation to obey "just" laws as a starting point. Socrates ar-
gued specifically that law-breaking injures the community, and one
should suffer unjustly rather than injure others unjustly. However, he
argued that the integrity of one's soul is so important that no authority
should be able to force a person to "do wrong," no matter the circum-
stances. Aquinas argued similarly, although he did not put as much
weight as did Socrates upon the injury to the community that may
occur with every failure to obey an unjust law. Therefore, the Thomist
formulation goes like this: There is an obligation to obey just laws,
but no obligation to obey unjust laws, except for the sake of avoiding
scandal or causing a civic disturbance. Both of these exceptions can
be enfolded into the Socratic position that it is better to suffer an in-
justice than to harm others unjustly. Scandal means that an innocent
person is led to do something wrong. The charge to avoid causing a
civic disturbance is a shorthand way of discouraging riots or other
128 The issue is discussed frequently in DUTY TO OBEY, supra note 3. See, e.g., Kent
Greenawalt, Legitimate Authority and the Duty to Obey, in DUTY TO OBEY, supra note 3, at 177,
179 (stating that life would be impossible without government); Mark C. Murphy, Surrender of
Judgment and the Consent Theory of Political Authority, in DUTY TO OBEY, supra note 3, at
319, 321 (listing the natural duty of justice among the principles of political authority); Rolf
Sartorius, Political Authority and Political Obligation, in DUTY TO OBEY, supra note 3, at 143,
144-49 (analogizing political authority to parental authority); Philip Soper, Legal Theory and
the Claim of Authority, in DUTY TO OBEY, supra note 3, at 213, 213 ("[Tjhere is a necessary
connection between law and morality.").
129 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTs 232 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1988)
("There must be either unanimity, or authority. There are no other possibilities."). I take much
of what follows from Finnis, the foremost neo-Thomist legal and political philosopher of our
time.
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disorderly exhibitions, where people may be physically injured or
placed in fear of injury.
Finally, for Aquinas there is an absolute obligation to disobey any
law that would force one to do something that is forbidden by "divine
law."'130 Here is a place where the Thomist vocabulary must yield,
although the impulse and meaning is not different from the Socratic
position. Aquinas simply means you must disobey if the law requires
you "to do wrong." Aquinas understands the duty to disobey in a re-
ligious as opposed to a secular way. Now, I am not denying that the
particulars of what it means to do wrong may differ from the religious
to the secular, but they may also differ from religion to religion and
secular to secular, depending upon the conscience and the reasoning
of the individual citizen.' 3 ' The theory does not depend upon the
concrete answer given to a particular question concerning the justice
or injustice of a given law, or the injury involved in that law. Con-
science is the reason why. It is the basis of the moral life. The prime
value of civil disobedience as a method of law-breaking rests upon
the idea that different people may and often do come to different
moral conclusions regarding these matters. Civil disobedience, how-
ever, is a larger subject, one discussed later in this essay. 132 Before
doing that, let us turn to an important precursor of the modern theory
of civil disobedience, examining as we go the application of the
Thomist theory just described, and never forgetting the Socratic ex-
emplar.
II. ANTIGONE
On the surface, no two people seem more dissimilar than the Soc-
rates of Plato's Crito and the heroine of Sophocles' masterpiece, An-
tigone. The contrast is striking. On the one hand there is the calm
and reflective old man, quietly defending the position that requires
him not to escape his imprisonment, to obey the law, to drink the
hemlock, and finally die. On the other, there is the fiery young
woman, full of defiance, deliberately and openly breaking the law,
willing to accept death as a result. What binds them together as clas-
130 AQUINAS, supra note 78, at 97.
131 This is simply another way of stating the old law school maxim, "reasonable minds
may differ." Within the Thomist tradition, there has been a decided difference of opinion about
some of Aquinas' ideas between, for example, Finnis and philosopher Russell Hittinger. See
RUSSELL HrrrINGER, A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW NATURAL LAW THEORY 49 (1987) (discussing
weaknesses in Finnis' position on natural law). In fact, there are wide-ranging differences be-
tween several modern authors working in the neo-Thomist tradition. See, e.g., ANTHONY J.
LissKA, AQUINAS'S THEORY OF NATURAL LAW 27-43 (1996) (discussing the views of Maritain,
Simon, Golding, Veatch, Finnis, and Adler).
132 See discussion infra. Parts UI.A-B and notes 217-316 (discussing the theories and prac-
tices of civil disobedience used by Henry David Thoreau and Martin Luther King, Jr.).
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sic examples of moral heroism? And make no mistake about it, they
are the great moral exemplars of antiquity. Socrates is not just the
father of philosophy. He is the model of impeccable moral behav-
ior.133 And Antigone? Her popularity throughout the centuries has
been immense. She and Creon are Hegel's sub-text in his Phenome-
nology of Spirit. George Steiner says that there is no other literary
work that engaged philosophers and poets of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries like Antigone.134 Peter Levi sums up the general atti-
tude of many when he states: "If there was one supreme hour in the
fifth century B.C., perhaps it was that of the Antigone of Sophocles,
which was composed while the Parthenon was being built."'135 Of
course, much of the reason for this kind of high praise is due to the
masterful artistic achievement of Sophocles. Nevertheless, it is the
conflict between State and conscience that has kept Antigone alive for
many peoples and groups throughout the ages, 136 even in unsuspected
places. Theodore Ziolkowski reports that Sophocles' "Antigone was
performed some 150 times in Nazi Germany in sixteen different pro-
ductions between 1939 and 1944." 137 As we shall see, Jean Anouilh
produced his "modernized" version of the play in Paris in 1944.
Moreover, Anouilh's Antigone was "tolerated by the Nazis, despite a
heroine who clearly was meant to represent the French resistance,
because the figure of Creon just as clearly exemplified the tragic di-
lemma of the German occupation authorities.' 138
But to return to the question: What binds Socrates and Antigone
together as moral exemplars? Despite their differences in age, sex,
style, temperament, and circumstances, they both adhere to the prin-
ciple that no person, nor any law, may obligate them to commit an
immoral act, or what is the same thing, to prevent them from doing
what is right. Socrates walked away when ordered to arrest Leon of
Salamis, for he would not do wrong. He drank the hemlock because
he only had to suffer a wrong; he did not have to do wrong by his
obedience. Antigone had to disobey Creon's decree, or else fail in
her moral duty to bury her brother. We have already analyzed the
Socratic decision. It is time to turn to Antigone's defiant choice.
133 See JASPERS, supra note 106, at 17-22 (discussing the various perceptions of Socrates).
134 THEODORE ZIOLKOWSKI, THE MIRROR OF JUSTICE 144-45 (1997).
135 Peter Levi, Greek Drama, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE CLASSICAL WORLD 156
(John Boardman et al. eds., 1986).
136 ZIOLKOWSKI, supra note 134, at 145 ("The preoccupation with Sophocles' drama has
continued unabated into the late twentieth century, wherein it has became par excellence exem-
plary for the resistance to tyranny.").
137 Id. at 145.138 Id.
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A. Sophocles' Antigone
Sophocles' play itself is wonderful in so many ways, but its econ-
omy is breathtaking. It opens with Antigone's announcement to her
sister, Ismene, of a "new decree of our King Creon."' 139 She alludes to
their present situation, which would be well-known to an Athenian
audience. Their father, King Oedipus, unknowingly killed his own
father and married his mother. The two sisters, together with their
two brothers, Eteocles and Polyneices, are the offspring of that inces-
tuous union. All manner of evil has been visited upon the family and
their homeland, Thebes, because of Oedipus' offense. Finally, Poly-
neices made war on the city, where his brother ruled, because Eteo-
des would not relinquish power to Polyneices as agreed upon. Each
brother slew the other in combat. Thebes was successfully defended
and the children's maternal uncle, Creon, came to rule as a result of
the death of the two brothers. Creon immediately decreed that the
body of Polyneices would not be buried because he was a traitor.
Anyone who tried to bury him would suffer "[s]toning to death in the
public square."'14° All the background is stated briefly, and the fol-
lowing colloquy ensues:
ANTIGONE: Ismene, I am going to bury him. Will you
come?
ISMENE: Bury him! You have just said the new law forbids
it.
ANTIGONE: He is my brother. And he is your brother, too.
ISMENE: But think of the danger! Think what Creon will
do!
ANTIGONE: Creon is not strong enough to stand in my
way.141
After Ismene offers the excuse that they are "only women,"' 42
Antigone shows utter disdain for her sister, and offers briefly the ma-
jor justification for her action, that "this crime is holy."143 The laws
139 SOPHOCLES, Antigone, in THE OEDIPUS CYCLE 183, 186 (Dudley Fitts & Robert Fitz-
gerald trans., 1949) [hereinafter Antigone].
140 Id. at 186.
141 Id. at 187.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 188.
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of the gods must be obeyed as against mere human laws. Ismene of-
fers one last response. Although the laws of the gods mean much to
her, she has "no strength [t]o break laws that were made for the public
good."'144 The sisters part with Antigone defiant and angry that Is-
mene will not help. A resigned Ismene says: "Go then, if you feel
that you must. You are unwise, [b]ut a loyal friend indeed to those
who love you." 145
All that is prologue, and prepares us for Creon's arrival. Immedi-
ately he announces the principles upon which he will rule. He will do
what he thinks is "best for the State," and will condemn anyone who
"sets private friendship above public welfare."' 46 Then he states his
"command" as the new king of Thebes. Eteocles will be buried with
full military honors; Polyneices is to have no burial. He goes on, "No
man is to touch him or say the least prayer for him; he shall lie on the
plain, unburied; and the birds and the scavenging dogs can do with
him whatever they like." 47 His justification is simple; "no traitor is
going to be honored with the loyal man."' 48 He admonishes the pub-
lic to "give no support to whoever breaks this law."'149 The spokes-
person for the public, Choragos, expresses his understanding that
death will follow disobedience.
A sentry interrupts to tell Creon that someone attempted to bury
Polyneices by sprinkling dust on the body. He does not know who,
however. Creon is outraged. He accuses the sentry of the deed, and
suggests that a bribe is at the root of the problem. Although the sen-
try is a buffoon in some respects, and clearly fears Creon's arbitrary
use of power, he does talk boldly to the king when the latter tells him
his very voice "distresses" him. The sentry replies: "Are you sure
that it is my voice, and not your conscience?" Just before leaving he
continues: "How dreadful it is when the right judge judges wrong!,"50
Clearly Sophocles is stacking the deck. Creon is hot-headed,
rigid, and fearful less he lose control of the ship of state. His decree
is ill-considered. The choral ode that follows-the famous "Ode to
Man"--puts the matter in a different perspective:
When the laws are kept, how proudly his city stands!
When the laws are broken, what of his city then?
15
144 Id.
145 Id. at 190.
146 Id. at 192-93.
147 Id. at 193.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 194.
150 Id. at 197-98.
151 Id. at 199.
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It is the Naomi of the Crito, arguing that to break the law is to do
violence against the state. However, the word "laws" is ambiguous
here. Other translations capture the meaning more clearly, suggesting
that it is the interweaving of law and justice that make the city great,
or as Robert Fagles translates, "the laws of the land, and the justice of
the gods." 152 This sets the stage for the great confrontation between
Creon and Antigone. The sentry brings the woman in and she readily
confesses to knowing the law and defying it. She says:
I dared.
It was not God's proclamation. That final Justice
That rules the world below makes no such laws.
Your edict, King, was strong,
But all your strength is weakness itself against
The immortal unrecorded laws of God.
They are not merely now: they were, and shall be,
Operative for ever, beyond man utterly.
153
Taking this as an attack on his manhood, and not for its meaning,
Creon retorts:
This girl is guilty of a double insolence,
Breaking the given laws and boasting of it.
Who is the man here,
She or I, if this crime goes unpunished? 54
Antigone responds:
I should have praise and honor for what I have done.
All these men here would praise me
Were their lips not frozen shut with fear of you.
[Bitterly]
Ah the good fortune of kings,
Licensed to say and do whatever they please!155
They continue to spar until Creon accuses Antigone of insulting
the memory of Eteocles, the patriot. Antigone softens then:
ANTIGONE: The dead man would not say that I insult it.
152 SOPHOCLES, Antigone, in SOPHOCLES: THE THREE THEBAN PLAYS 55, 77 (Robert
Fagles trans., 1982) [hereinafter Fagles].
153 Antigone, supra note 139, at 203.
15 Id. at 204.
155 Id.
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CREON: He would: for you honor a traitor as much as him.
ANTIGONE: His own brother, traitor or not, and equal in
blood.
CREON: He made war on his country. Eteocles defended it.
ANTIGONE: Nevertheless, there are honors due all the
dead.
CREON: But not the same for the wicked as for the just.
ANTIGONE: Ah Creon, Creon, which of us can say what
the gods hold wicked?
CREON: An enemy is an enemy, even dead.
ANTIGONE: It is my nature to join in love, not hate. 156
Although haughty and defiant, Antigone shows a meditative and
loving side as well. She loves her brother. As Mary Whitlock Blun-
dell points out in her treatment of the ordinary morality of ancient
Greece, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies,157 Antigone is
"philia," meaning she has "kinship" love for him. This implies loy-
alty and obligation, reaching beyond affection to embrace the whole
of her family. 158 And love for her brother and piety toward the gods
sometimes demands something different from harming enemies,
which would have been the normal Greek way. Blundell claims that
"Antigone is the only character in Sophocles who explicitly purports
to value philia above hatred."'' 59 Antigone does not deny that Poly-
neices was wrong in attacking the city (though query what should be
the moral judgment upon Eteocles, who refused to turn over the realm
to his brother pursuant to their agreement to share rule on a year-only
basis?). Nevertheless, whether Polyneices was right or wrong, Anti-
gone must do the right thing, i.e., bury her brother. As Ziolkowski
says, "Few of the unwritten laws of Greek antiquity match in urgency
the sacred commandment to bury the dead."16w Even the anger of
156 Id.at205-06.
1-7 BLUNDELL, supra note 64.
158 Id. at 106-09.
159 Id. at 106.
160 ZIOLKOWSKI, supra note 134, at 146.
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Achilles abates sufficiently for him to turn over the dead body of
Hector, his bitter enemy, to Hector's father, Priam, for burial.
161
Under Athenian law as it developed in the fifth century, although
the worst of executed criminals were not officially buried, their
corpses were thrown outside the city walls so that the families could
bury them elsewhere.' 62 Within the play, the unwritten law of the
gods that bodies should be buried was emphasized not only by Anti-
gone, but by Creon's son, Haimon, and by the religious seer, Tiresias.
Antigone's early statement that the people of the city supported her
position is echoed by Haimon later, thus suggesting the rule to bury
was also a matter of customary ancient religious law.163 The contrast
between the rightness of Antigone's actions and the wrong-
headedness of Creon's is evident throughout. This is an important
point because Creon has had his defenders; moreover, among those
who admit Creon's tyrannous nature, there are some who think Creon
had "worthy principles," but simply failed "to apply them appropri-
ately to the case in hand."'164 Nevertheless, even the chorus, which
seems to side with Creon until the end, early on proclaims that the
best ruler is the one who honors the laws of the land and the justice of
the gods. 165
This is not to deny that, from a psychological and dramatic point
of view, the clash between Creon and Antigone is unworthy. Quite
the contrary is true. Otherwise the play would not continue to elicit
the regard it does. Still, it was Aristotle, writing a mere century after
the play's first performance, who identified it philosophically as the
place par excellence where one could witness the clash between hu-
man "particular" law and the law of nature or "universal law." In On
Rhetoric, he says:
[F]or there is in nature a common principle of the just and
unjust that all people in some way divine, even if they have
no association or commerce with each other, for example,
what Antigone in Sophocles' play seems to speak of when
161 See HOMER, THE ILiAD 587 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Anchor Books 1975). After
much anger and delay, but at the behest of the gods, Achilles says to the slain man's father: "As
you wished, sir, the body of your son is now set free. He lies in state. At the first sight of Dawn
you shall take charge of him yourself and see him.' Id.
162 ZIOLKOWSKI, supra note 134, at 146. These problems are enduring. See Norimitsu
Onishi, Not for a Nigerian Hero the Peace of the Grave, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2000, at A3
(discussing the trouble a famous African writer's ninety-four year-old father has had in burying
his son, a victim of political warfare).
163 ZIOLKOVSKI, supra note 134, at 147.
164 BLUNDELL, supra note 64, at 116-17.
165 ZIOLKOWSKI, supra note 134, at 149. See also Fagles, supra note 152, at77 ("When he
weaves in the laws of the land, and the justice of the gods that binds his oaths together he and
his city rise high.").
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she says that though forbidden, it is just to bury Polyneices,
since this is just by nature .... 166
He then quotes lines previously quoted:
They are not merely now; they were, and shall be, operative
for ever, beyond man utterly.
Though my basic intention is to point out that, morally, Antigone
acted in a manner consistent with the Thomistic theory alluded to
above, and with Socratic philosophy and action, it is still useful to
sketch Antigone's acts in more detail. The manner is every bit as im-
portant in the moral life as the matter.
First, it should be noted that Antigone acted openly and non-
violently. When Ismene says she will keep the deed secret, Antigone
declares:
Oh tell it! Tell everyone!
Think how they'll hate you when it all comes out
If they learn that you knew about it all the time. 168
There are mixed motives here, of course. Antigone is bating her
cowardly sister, but clearly Antigone defies the law for the sake of
obedience to higher law. Moreover, she either wants the world to
know it, or is, at least, indifferent to publicity. This is how she is de-
scribed by the sentry who observed her performing the burial rites for
the second time, the first having been undone by the guards:
I have seen
A mother bird come back to a stripped nest, heard
Her crying bitterly a broken note or two
For the young ones stolen. Just so, when this girl
Found the bare corpse, and all her love's work wasted,
She wept, and cried on heaven to damn the hands
That had done this thing.
And then she brought more dust
And sprinkled wine three times for her brother's ghost.169
166 ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC 102 (George A. Kennedy trans., Oxford University Press
1991) [hereinafter ON RHETORIC].
167 Antigone, supra note 139, at 203. I have used the Fitts-Fitzgerald translation previously
cited at note 152 for the sake of consistency. Kennedy translates the line slightly differently in
his version of Aristotle's On Rhetoric. See ON RHETORIC, supra note 166, at 103.
168 Antigone, supra note 139, at 189.
169 Id. at202.
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After this speech, she is immediately arrested, but evidences no
fear, and readily admits her deed. Thus, she is simply and openly per-
forming her obligation to bury her brother. There is nothing violent
or clandestine about her acts. Accompanying violence, of course,
would at least be morally troublesome. She injured no one. She cre-
ated no civic disorder.
Later, in her last speeches before being entombed, she shows both
the fear of oncoming death and regret that she will not ever be wife or
mother. Nevertheless, she continues to proclaim that she dies because
she chose to obey divine rather than human law, even if her final
statement of that law seems at odds with her earlier sweeping gener-
alizations and Tiresias' traditional understanding of it.170 So discor-
dant with the rest of the play is this final statement that critics doubt
its very authenticity. Some noted translators simply leave it out of the
translation as a corruption of the original text.17 Here are the ques-
tionable lines:
[If I had been the mother of children
or if my husband died, exposed and rotting-
I'd never have taken this ordeal upon myself,
never defied our people's will. What law,
you ask, do I satisfy with what I say?
A husband dead, there might have been another.
A child by another too, if I had lost the first.
But mother and father both lost in the halls of Death,
no brother could ever spring to light again. 72
This may be the last plea of a frightened girl, trying to justify her-
self and perhaps arouse sympathy by narrowing her statement of what
the gods demand, or at least, of what she would be willing to do to
satisfy the gods' demand. Her claim is that she would never have
broken the law if the unburied body was that of a husband or child,
rather than a father, mother or any sibling, once the parents are dead.
Surely the ancient law concerning burial of the dead made no such
distinctions. The gods decreed that bodies should be buried, else not
be admitted to the nether world. It seems odd that her duty to hus-
band or child would be less because they are replaceable in a given
170 Antigone, supra note 139, at 228 (referring to the lack of burial for Polyneices, Tiresias
says: "You have kept from the gods below the child that is theirs").
171 The Fitts-Fitzgerald translation leaves it out. See ZIOLKOWSKI, supra note 134, at 150
(citing proponents on both sides).
172 Fagles, supra note 152, at 105.
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person's life. This personalizes the rule too much, and undercuts its
basic purpose, i.e., to ready the body for its reception in the afterlife.
It is also curious that the law Antigone defies is spoken of as "our
people's will" rather than the will of Creon, a man seemingly blind to
or obtuse concerning the will of the citizenry. This language may
reflect a belief in the communal dimension of law, whatever its ori-
gins. However, "our people's will" does seem to be a phrase Sopho-
cles' Antigone would not use. She clearly attributes this law to
Creon, as against the will of the people. It is one of the fundamental
tensions of the play that Creon asserts his will and power to make law
in a manner which violates the custom and will of Thebes.
I side with those who think the speech so inconsistent with the
rest of the text of the play that I would eliminate it as inauthentic.
173
On the other hand, the moral point remains the same whether or not
the speech is authentic. If not burying traitors like Polyneices was a
law voted upon in good democratic fashion by the citizens of Thebes,
Antigone would still be justified in disobeying it because at least the
divine law encompassed the burial of an orphaned brother. Thus, An-
tigone would still have a higher obligation to perform these burial
rites than to refrain because of the dictates of the law.
This higher obligation may be thought of either as a universal
moral rule as opposed to a particular enacted law, as Aristotle had it,
or it may be thought of as a matter of conscience, in keeping with the
Socratic dictate that in the moral life, conscience is the final arbiter.
Because there will be disagreement over the moral rightness of any
law-defying act, it is important that arguments over the manner be
assessed carefully. That is why justifications for civil disobedience
focus equally on manner as well as matter. Antigone is a forerunner
but not an example of civil disobedience. She simply had a higher
duty to bury her brother. In terms of the play itself, it seems to me
that Antigone, had she the wherewithal, could have removed the body
of Polyneices and buried it in a clandestine way because the decree of
Creon violated a higher law obligation or because it was starkly in-
consistent with the customary law of the people of Thebes. More im-
portantly, it would have forced her to do wrong, or at least not to do
what she believed to be the right thing. As Aquinas would have it,
Creon's decree is not binding because it is unjust; to disobey it would
neither cause scandal (the people believe the body should be buried),
nor otherwise cause a public disturbance where greater harm en-
173 Another good reason for believing the lines to be bogus is the poetry itself, which
Robert Fitzgerald says is "a series of limping verses whose sense is as discordant as their
sound." Antigone, supra note 139, at 240.
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sues. 174 Although Socrates never went as far as Aquinas when saying
"unjust laws do not bind in conscience, except to avoid scandal or a
greater disturbance," the Thomist position is consistent with Socrates'
decision not to escape prison, because to do so would give "scandal,"
i.e., it would teach the wrong lesson. Moreover, as with Socrates, the
distinction between aspiration and obligation dissolves. Antigone
believed herself under a moral obligation to bury her brother. Could
that obligation be morally excused because she would have to suffer
death to fulfill it? To focus the question better, is Ismene guilty of a
moral fault because she had not Antigone's courage to bury the body
come what may? Maybe Antigone was not courageous but fool-
hardy.175 Surely Ismene thought so originally, although later she
changed her mind and wanted to stand with Antigone in accepting
punishment for the burial, even though she had refused to help per-
form the act.176 The point here is not to assess Ismene's moral guilt,
but to show how difficult it is in practice to separate the narrow no-
tion of obligation from the ideal of virtue, expressed both in Socrates'
refusal to escape prison and in Antigone's determination to obey di-
vine law even if that meant defiance of a human law.
It should also be pointed out that, in assessing Antigone's moral
behavior, it makes no difference that Creon is portrayed as unsympa-
thetically as he is. Although there are some who see strong leadership
qualities in this king, as I have pointed out, Sophocles stacks the deck
against him. He may, in fact, be a true Sophoclean tragic figure
achieving wisdom through suffering, 77 but he is also a man of large
faults, all of which contribute to the deaths of three people and to a
blight upon the state he governs. 178 He is almost pathologically sus-
picious, accusing the sentry179 and Tiresias' 80 directly of bribe-taking,
even though, in the latter's case, the old blind seer had always given
him sound counsel, and even helped him ascend to the throne. 18
Creon is also hot-tempered and seems to have a deaf ear to any argu-
174 For Aquinas an "unjust" law does not obligate on its own because it "seems to be no
law at all." AQUINAS, supra note 78, at 97. This follows from his definition of law: "[A]n
ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and
promulgated." Id. at 10-Il. Creon's decree was not reasonable, nor directed at the common
good.
175 See NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 44, at 74 (stating the Aristotelian belief that
courage is the mean between cowardice and rash behavior).
176 Antigone, supra note 139, at 206-07.
'77 See ZIOLKOWSKI, supra note 134, at 152 n.23.
178 Tiresias attributes the calamities falling on Thebes to Creon's prideful conduct. See
Antigone, supra note 139, at 225-26. Creon himself says at the end of the play, "I alone am
guilty." Id. at 237.
179 Id. at 197.
18o Id.at226.
181 Id. at 227.
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ment but his own. This makes him extremely egocentric or scarily
obtuse. He is also a misogynist. Throughout the play, he disparages
women, and assesses all weakness as womanish, even a man's. 18
Ziolkowski says Creon's misogyny is "so pronounced that modern
analysts might suspect an underlying feeling of sexual inadequacy."'
183
At the end of the play, of course, he has grown as a character. He
clearly acknowledges that "I alone am guilty, '' 184 for the deaths of
Antigone, and both Haimon, his son, and his own wife, Eurydice.
Haimon committed suicide over the loss of Antigone, his bride-to-be.
Eurydice did the same over of the loss of her son. There is also a
credible argument that Creon is himself a law-breaker. There are at
least three instances that can be cited. Each involves examples of the
"higher law" of the gods or of the customary law of the people, an-
other form of higher law.185 First, the decree that Polyneices may not
be buried is against the will of the gods, and Thebeian custom. Sec-
ond, the gods are also offended by Creon's decision to bury Antigone
alive beneath the earth. Creon actually changed the penalty for her
offense from stoning to burial alive because he did not want the state
to be polluted by the blood.186 By this he showed some nervousness
over what the gods might do. For these two crimes against the gods'
laws, Tiresias prophecies that "the Furies and the dark gods of Hell
[a]re swift with terrible punishment for you." 187 Third, there is a good
argument that Creon deprived his son of Haimon's marital right. Al-
though oblique in the text, there is authority to support the proposition
that custom would have had Creon allow the husband to deal with his
misguided wife (or betrothed). Ismene says at one point, "Haimon,
how your father wrongs you! ',188 And Choragos, the leader of the
chorus, comes closer to claiming a legal violation, when he says to
Creon: "Do you really intend to steal this girl from your son?"189
So laden with faults is Creon that he risks being a stock figure.
Indeed, Robert Fitzgerald suggests that if masks are used in the per-
formance of the play, Creon should be masked as one of those "de-
personalized by official position," although, "[i]f Creon is masked,
we see no objection, in art or feeling, to the symbolic removal of his
182 Id., at 204 ("Who is the man here, [s]he or I... ?"), and at 212 ("If we must lose, [i]et's
lose to a man at least! Is a woman stronger than we?").
183 ZIOLKOWSKI, supra note 134, at 153.
184 Antigone, supra note 139, at 237.
185 Customary law was basic law in ancient Greece, just as it was for so many societies
until modern times. Aquinas said that "custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the
interpreter of law." AQUINAS, supra note 78, at 112.
186 Antigone, supra note 139, at 218.
187 Id. at 228.
188 Id. at208.
189 Id. at 209.
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mask before he returns with the dead body of his son."'' Neverthe-
less, even if Creon is given a more human dimension, or better argu-
ments, the moral analysis remains the same. The issue is not the
good-faith or decency of the law-maker, but the impact of the laws
upon the law-breaker. In Socratic or Thomist terms, is the law forc-
ing the citizen to do something unjust or requiring the citizen to re-
frain from performing his or her moral obligation? 191 For Antigone,
clearly, it was the latter situation.
19 2
If the focus is on the law-breaker, what result if the same set of
circumstances faces a different kind of Antigone? What if she is less
mature and less certain of the moral claim the burial of her brother
has upon her? Is the moral analysis the same? To examine the ques-
tion concretely, I turn now to look at Jean Anouilh's 1944 re-writing
of Antigone.
B. Anouilh 's Antigone
Although Jean Anouilh read and re-read Sophicles' Antigone, and
knew the play "by heart forever,"' 193 when he came to write his own
version, he produced something "dramatically different in form, con-
tent, and language from Sophocles's play."'' 4 The main characters
are transformed into very different people. Creon is the world-weary
bureaucrat, thrust into leadership by events, and wanting nothing
more than to do his job. Of course the job, as he conceives it, re-
quires him to be tough, cruel, and duplicitous. He does not seem
power-hungry, as he does in the Sophoclean version. But he is deeply
cynical. He would gladly save Antigone, whom he has always been
"fond of,"' 95 if she will just keep her mouth shut about the burial, and
get on with things. He will otherwise be forced to execute her, he
explains, because once the people know she is a law-breaker, he will
have no choice.9 6 Obviously, he thinks the people need to be ruled
with an uncompromising iron hand. That aspect of his character, of
course, is consistent with the Sophoclean version. On the subject of
19 Id. at243.
191 Socrates says: "I would never submit wrongly to any authority through fear of death,
but would refuse at any cost-even that of my life.' Apology, supra note 10, at 56. Aquinas
writes: "[Liaws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good... and laws of this
kind must nowise be observed." AQUINAS, supra note 78, at 97.
192 In this case, act and omission to act are the same, culpable. This distinction is alive in
modem criminal codes, where omissions are culpable if the actor is under an obligation to per-
form. See, e.g., MODEL PENALCODE § 2.01(3)(b) (1962).
193 Susan W. Tiefenbrun, On Civil Disobedience, Jurisprudence, Feminism and the Law in
the Antigones of Sophocles andAnouilh, 11 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LrTERATURE 35, 43 (1999).
194 Id.
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the burial itself, however, he is not wedded to either his own decree or
his own will to power. In fact, he thinks the whole idea of leaving
bodies unburied is "monstrously stupid."' 97 If it were up to him, he
tells Antigone, he would bury the body for the sake of "public hy-
giene." He hates the smell of it. But since he has just put down a
revolution, "that stench has got to fill the town for a month," so that
the "featherheaded rabble" he governs are subdued and quiescent. 19
8
At the end of the play, he not only remains unchanged by the deaths
of his son and his wife, but immediately after hearing of his queen's
suicide, he saunters off to a late afternoon cabinet meeting. 199 Surely
this is parody. Whatever else it is, it is not Sophocles' Creon.
When it comes to Antigone, the change in character is equally
pronounced. Instead of a mature woman, sure of her beliefs, Anouilh
gives us a flighty, immature girl, who says at her end that she does
not even know what she is dying for.2 ° On the other hand, Anouilh
does drop contradictory hints about her reasons and motives. For ex-
ample, when Creon first asks her point blank why she disobeyed the
decree and buried her brother, she says, "I owed it to him. Those who
are not buried wander eternally and find no rest."20' This is a cryptic
version of the original reason given by Sophocles' Antigone, and un-
derscored by Tiresias, 2 who, by the way, is noticeably absent from
Anouilh's play. It is divine law for the benefit of the dead. Later,
under cross-examination by Creon, she seems to admit that she does
not believe in the religious notions underpinning burial of the dead,
agreeing that at least the priestly "jibber-jabber" is "absurd." °3 The
colloquy continues:
CREON: Then why, Antigone, why? For whose sake? For
the sake of them that believe in it? To raise them against me?
ANTIGONE: No.
CREON: For whom then if not for them and not for
Polynices either?
197 Id. at 34.
198 Id. at 34-35.
199 Id. at 52.
200 Id. at 50.
201 Id. at 29.
202 Antigone, supra note 139, at 228.
203 ANOUILH, supra note 195, at 32. Like many moderns, she may reject the "shuffling,
mumbling ministrations of the priests," but not the underlying belief. The text is ambiguous-
deliberately, I think.
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ANTIGONE: For nobody. For myself.204
The idea that it is all "absurd," and yet Antigone still chooses to
do it as an act of absurdist freedom is pure mid-century French
existentialist ideology. It could have been lifted straight from the
pages of Camus or Sartre.
205
The Sisyphusian theme is sounded when Creon tells Antigone
how futile her act will be:
What good will it do? You know that there are other men
standing guard over Polynices. And even if you did cover
him over with earth again, the earth would again be re-
movedYms
Antigone replies in words reminiscent of Sisyphus pushing the
rock up the hill, knowing, of course, that it will roll down again.
I know all that. I know it. But that much, at least, I can do.
And what a person can do, a person ought to do.
Possible also, of course, is the idea that the absurd gesture will
have positive consequences. When Ismene tries to stand with her sis-
ter and tells her, in Creon's presence, that she will bury their brother
that very night, Antigone breathlessly turns toward the King and says:
You hear that, Creon? The thing is catching! Who knows
but that lots of people will catch the disease from me!208
However, immediately afterwards, she dares Creon once again to
call the guards and begin the process of her execution. So, does she
have a death wish? Remember, Xenophon thought Socrates might
harbor such a wish, too. I think not. The Antigone of Anouilh's play
is very much a lover of sensuous life.209 There is a difference be-
tween resignation or martyrdom for moral ends, and a wish to be dead
because life is unbearable. Actually the Creon of both plays seems a
more likely candidate for entertaining a death-wish than either of the
Antigones. The reason behind Antigone's possible death-wish might
be youthful idealism. Antigone cannot bear to live in a world where
people like Creon rule, and inevitably must rule. In a bitter retort to
w04 Id. at 32-33.
2o The classic texts are ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS (Justin O'Brien trans.,
Vintage Books 1955); JEAN PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS (Hazel E. Barnes trans.,
Washington Square Press, Inc. 1966).
26 ANOUILH, supra note 195, at 32.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 44.
209 See id. at 6-7.
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Creon's suggestion that "Life is nothing more than the happiness that
you get out of it,"' 210 Antigone says:
What kind of happiness do you foresee for me? Paint me the
picture of your happy Antigone. What are the unimportant
little sins that I shall have to commit before I am allowed to
sink my teeth into life and tear happiness from it? Tell me: to
whom shall I have to lie? Upon whom shall I have to fawn?
To whom must I sell myself? Whom do you want me to
leave dying, while I turn away my eyes?
21
'
Yet another possible explanation for Antigone's actions may be
found in the text-an adolescent power play. Here is evidence of that
possibility:
CREON: [takes a step toward her]. I want to save you, An-
tigone.
ANTIGONE: You are the king, and you are all-powerful.
But that you cannot do.
CREON: You think not?
ANTIGONE: Neither save me nor stop me.
CREON: Prideful Antigone! Little Oedipus!
ANTIGONE: Only this can you do: have me put to death.212
At one point, Creon loses his temper and actually grabs Antigone,
twisting her arm to cause her physical pain. In exasperation, he says:
What fun for you, eh? To be able to spit in the face of a king
who has all the power in the world; a man who has done his
own killing in his day; who has killed people just as pitiable
as you are-and who is still soft enough to go to all this trou-
ble in order to keep you from being killed.213
Whatever the mix of motive and reason leading to Antigone's
confusion at the end of the play, it is hard not to see her willingness to
die as a moral decision. Anouilh has her say: "I can say no to any-
210 Id. at41.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 33.
213 Id. at34.
[Vol. 52:655
ETHICS IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW
thing I think vile," and "I don't have to do things that I think are
wrong."214 These are not reasons but conclusions. Still, they sound
like conclusions of conscience, even if Antigone cannot articulate the
reasons why her conscience tells her that it would be wrong for her
not to bury her brother. I surely have known people who have lost
their faith in a religious belief system and deny that "God's will" is a
meaningful statement, but will keep the moral positions of that earlier
faith, just feeling somehow it is the right thing to do. Ethics is an at-
tempt to put consistent reasoning and argumentation behind moral
judgments and actions. Nevertheless, I do not think it is appropriate
to call actions immoral or moral simply because a person's underly-
ing reasoning is confused or flawed or even non-existent. Remember,
James Boyd White thought Socrates' arguments against escaping
from prison in the Crito "very weak indeed., 215 Of course, T. S. Eliot
puts the following words in Beckett's mouth, as the saint examines
his own conscience in the face of death: "The last temptation is the
greatest treason: To do the right deed for the wrong reason. ', 216 But
Beckett's "wrong reason" was pride, a deadly sin. It was not confu-
sion over reasons or the making of bad arguments. So long as good
conscience is the moving consideration, the deed may be justifiable
morally for the person who is acting. This is not to say it is justifiable
ethically. And it is that tension-between moral justification and
ethical justification-that leads to something like civil disobedience
as an important component of any theory of political obligation.
The argument goes like this. If we say (1) that unjust laws do not
obligate except to avoid scandal or disturbance, and (2) that one must
always disobey a law or order commanding the individual to do
wrong, then the individual is left to determine what constitutes an un-
just law, and further, whether any of the exceptions apply in the case
at hand. If we generally subscribe to the idea that, in public matters, a
person should not be the judge in his or her own case, with myopia,
prejudice, and selfishness being endemic to the human personality,
then it would be helpful to have a way to appeal to the conscience or
sense of justice of the wider community in connection with the com-
mission of an illegal act. Clearly, sometimes that will be impossible.
Suppose, for example, you came across a fugitive slave hiding in your
barn during the ante-bellum period. To assist that fugitive to escape
is the right thing to do. If ever laws were unjust, those establishing
slavery and keeping slaves in bondage are prime examples. More-
214 Id. at 35.
215 White, supra note 38, at 97.
216 T.S. ELIOT, Murder in the Cathedral, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 173, 196
(1971).
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over, to alert the authorities to the slave's whereabouts means you are,
arguably, doing something wrong in and of itself-you are helping
the slaveholder to continue to deprive the slave of his or her right to
be free.
Now, the only way to assist the slave to escape is to do so clan-
destinely. Otherwise the slave may be caught and returned to the os-
tensible "owner." Even here, there is need for some thought and per-
haps discussion, too, with other good people, less the conscience be
formed too hastily. Still, the example given seems easy enough to
defend as having to be done non-publicly. It should also be easy to
see why clandestine law-breaking presents such a huge moral prob-
lem both for the law-breaker as well as for the body politic. Suppose
I object to the tax system. I deeply believe that a flat income tax is
immoral, that only a graduated income tax passes moral muster. Al-
though not convincing to the majority, there are plausible moral ar-
guments supporting this position. Suppose a flat tax is passed. Am I
justified in withholding my legally ordained share because I consider
the law immoral? And may I do so by filing a fraudulent return? No
citizen should take comfort in affirmative answers to those questions.
It is precisely these kinds of biting questions that lead some to argue
that no law-breaking can be justified, less the body politic be irrepa-
rably weakened. This is the Naomi again at her insistent best. Socra-
tes proclaimed that one should either obey or convince the citizenry
that the law is unjust. That proclamation seems to demand "public"
disobedience. Nevertheless, at least in the ante-bellum fugitive slave
case, quiet resistance seems morally worthy. Still, the problem of
one's larger obligation to the community persists. The individual
may be wrong. Even if the individual is not wrong, the community
may think so, and "fair play" argues for obedience or at least submis-
sion to the penalty. Antigone is the example of a case where con-
science demanded disobedience, but obligations to the community led
to publicity, non-violence, and a willingness to accept punishment.
That takes us a long way toward civil disobedience as it has been
classically understood. Let us examine that phenomenon now.
III. CiviL DISOBEDIENCE
A. Henry David Thoreau
From 1842 to 1846, Henry David Thoreau quietly refused to pay
the Massachusetts poll tax. 217 In July 1846 he was arrested for this
217 See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, THE VARIORUM CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 11-27 (1967)
[hereinafter VARIORUM].
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offense, spent one night in jail, and was released the next day because
an anonymous person paid the tax for him. In January 1848, he spoke
to the Concord Lyceum about this matter, publishing a version of that
speech in 1849, under the title Resistance to Civil Government.2 A
slightly revised version, published in 1866, four years after Thoreau's
death, was called Civil Disobedience.219 It is the revised version that
virtually every student in America reads. Gandhi read it too, and was
influenced by it, attributing the coinage of the term "civil disobedi-
ence" to Thoreau.Y The rest of the world seems to have accepted the
attribution. I mention this history to point out that the modern under-
standing of the term is different from what we can fairly attribute to
Thoreau,221 and that Thoreau himself had more a writerly than phi-
losophical interest in the phrase that has since lived-particularly in
America-such a rich and independent life.
The essay itself was probably most accurately titled when it was
first given as a speech at the Lyceum. It was then called, On the
Relation of the Individual to the State. In each of the versions, we
find an honest man sorting out his own moral relationship with the
impersonal State. Its relevance to the subject at hand is crystal clear,
even as its meaning is both ambiguous and its educational value,
equivocal. The essay opens and closes with remarks that can best be de-
scribed as "utopian."2 For Thoreau envisions the best government
as the one "which governs not at all,"22 but leaves the individual
alone to pursue his own way.224 In between, though he never quite
forgets his utopianism, the author tries to speak "practically and as a
citizen." s Thoreau's first point is the thoroughly Socratic one that a
21s Because this version of the essay was published during Thoreau's lifetime, and because
there is no evidence that Thoreau revised it in the version published posthumously under the
title, Civil Disobedience, the Norton Critical Edition of the essay reproduces the originally pub-
lished version. See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND RESISTANCE TO CIVIL GOVERN-
MENT 226-45 (William Rossi ed., W.W. Norton & Company 2d ed. 1992) (1849) [hereinafter
Norton]. Other scholars not only accept the fact that Thoreau approved the later text, but also
argue that the ambiguity of the word "civil" was deliberately chosen "to tease the reader."
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 15-26 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1969) [hereinaf-
ter Bedau]. It matters little, for the two versions are nearly identical.
219 VARIORUM, supra note 217, at 27.
220 See Bedau, supra note 218, at 16 n.4; infra note 317 and accompanying text.
221 See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 363-66 (defining civil disobedience "as a public, nonvio-
lent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a
change in the law or policies of the government").
=' Of course, it could be called "anarchistic" too, but that seems far-fetched. See Bedau,
supra note 218, at 21 (stating that Thoreau's "vision is not of men ruled by no law at all ... but
of a life in which the claims of government have little significance in the day-to-day activities of
the individual. Thoreau is not so much opposed to government as he is unimpressed by and
uninterested in it").
223 VARIORUM, supra note 217, at 31.
224 See id. at 55.
= Id at 32.
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person must follow his conscience, and not give it up to anyone, not
even to majority rule.226 Nevertheless, the context in which the paean
to conscience is sung is most un-Socratic. It amounts to an attack on
the value of the State per se. He says, "Law never made men a whit
more just." 7 The result of "an undue respect for law" is the citi-
zenry marching to war against conscience and common sense. Most
serve the State with their bodies, says Thoreau, though a "very few..
. serve the State with their consciences also, and so necessarily resist
it for the most part."229 Pointing to the existence of slavery and to
what he considers the waging of an unjust war with Mexico, Tho-
reau-in moral anguish-says, "it is not too soon for honest men to
rebel and revolutionize." 30 He calls the argument to submit to law a
mere "expediency," and would instead have "justice, cost what it
may.,,2 31 He does seem to mean the Union itself should dissolve, for
he says, 'This people must cease holding slaves, and to make war on
Mexico, though it cost them their existence as a people.
' 232
So far, Thoreau seems to be saying two things. First, he thinks
government is, at best, a necessary evil. He thinks people accomplish
things. Government just gets in the way. This is a very American
impulse, seen in the early Constitutional debates to have "limited"
government, 3 and seen today in its clearest form in Ronald Reagan's
ascendancy to the Presidency and his legacy not just in conservative
Republican thinking, but in much of the Clinton administration's po-
sitions as well.2 4 Seen as a healthy suspicion of those who seek
power or as a political principle embodied in such ideas as "subsidiar-
226 See id. at 32-33.
227 Id. at 33.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 34.
230 Id. at 35.
231 Id.
232 Id. It should be noted that Thoreau was present when the abolitionist, William Lloyd
Garrison, burned the Constitution. Not only present, Thoreau was part of the program. See
Norton, supra note 218, at 425 n.1 (noting that Thoreau read his Slavery in Massachusetts on
the occasion). His sympathies with the rebel, John Brown, are also well-known. See also
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, The Last Days of John Brown, in THE PORTABLE THOREAU 676 (Carl
Bode ed., 1982) [hereinafter PORTABLE THOREAU].
23 See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS & JACK WALTER PELTASON, GOVERNMENT BY THE
PEOPLE, 61 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 5th ed. 1963) ("The framers' work became part of the American
creed; it stood for liberty, equality before the law, limited government .... ").
234 Gary Wills claims Reagan's legacy was to turn American suspicion of politics into
contempt for all government. Gary Wills, Reagan's Legacy; It's His Party, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
11, 1996, § 6, at 30, 55 ("Americans have always harbored a healthy suspicion toward politics
and politicians. But something different has been growing over the last 15 years-a positive
contempt for government."). I find that same "contempt" in Thoreau.
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ity,235 the impulse toward limited government may be salutary. How-
ever, the tendency to distrust government can lead to utopian fantasy,
or worse, practical naivet6. We are political and social animals, as the
ancients taught us. We need each other. In fact, we cannot do with-
out one another. This is true not just in the minimal sense of needing
some joint protection from adversaries, 36 but also in our need to have
an organization coordinating the myriad activities of any group. Tho-
reau is symptomatic of the problem. He refuses to pay the poll tax
because he considers it an "allegiance" tax, one that binds him to the
state. However, he "never declined paying the highway tax," as he
viewed paying that tax as demonstrating him to be a "good
neighbor." 237  But surely he did not pay money directly to his
neighbors to see that the roads were built and maintained. He paid
the money to the State. As was suggested before, the State is simply
the mechanism whereby the body politic operates.z8 And the body
politic is our "neighbors." Here is a compelling example of where the
anti-State rhetoric spins out of control. The State is not the commu-
nity; but the community needs to act in important ways through the
mechanism of the State. If the State is destroyed, another State will
be built. There is no other way. Of course, that does not mean that
certain forms of government should not be overturned, or at least that
some non-cooperation is not warranted. It just means we ought to
understand what we are doing when we "rebel and revolutionize." It
seems to me allegiance to a State is more complicated than allegiance
to governmental leaders or to their laws and policies. It always en-
tails some allegiance to the body politic, to our "neighbors," if you
will. We damage them when we damage the State. Again, this does
not mean it cannot or should not be done. It only means we ought to
be aware of what we are doing, whom we are injuring, and how we
are injuring them. Remember the Naomi's final point to Socrates: If
you break the law--especially one the lawbreaker does not consider
unjust-you injure "yourself, your friends, your country, and us." 39
It is Thoreau's second point that really seems to be the problem,
as it was at times for Socrates, Antigone, and often for citizens of any
23 "Subsidiarity" means letting the smallest unit within a larger organization perform all
tasks it is equipped to perform before pushing the problem upward to a larger unit. See FINNIS,
supra note 129, at 146-47.
236 Justification for a "minimal state" was all Robert Nozick could do in his famous mod-
em book. See ROBERTNOZiCK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
237 VARIORUM, supra note 217, at 50.
238 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 89, at 29 (arguing that the "state has priority over the
household and over any individual among us"); MARTrrAIN, supra note 87, at 10 ("The Body
Politic or the Political Society is the whole. The state is a part-the topmost part of this
whole.").
239 Crito, supra note 1, at 91.
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State. The citizen believes the State's laws and policies are unjust.
What should be done? Thoreau withholds the poll tax. He does so
for years, and it becomes a public matter only when he is arrested,
and thrown into jail for it. Is the poll tax itself unjust? Thoreau does
not say so. Indeed, there is no evidence he thought so. His concern
was "allegiance" to a government which allowed the holding of
slaves and which was waging war on Mexico. That State was both
the United States of America, and the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, the latter part of the former, but both responsible for the named
injustices.
"Unjust laws exist," proclaims Thoreau, "shall we be content to
obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend them, and obey them until
we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once?" Here, of
course, is the crucial question. Thoreau's answer, abstractly, is rather
Socratic:
If the injustice is part of the necessary friction of the ma-
chine of government, let it go, let it go: perchance it will
wear smooth,-.... certainly the machine will wear out. If
the injustice has a spring, or a pulley, or a rope, or a crank,
exclusively for itself, then perhaps you may consider whether
the remedy will not be worse than the evil; but if it is of such
a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to an-
other, then, I say, break the law. Let your life be a counter
friction to stop the machine. What I have to do is to see, at
any rate, that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I con-
demn.2 41
The last sentence echoes Socrates, Antigone, and Aquinas: the
State may not force me to do wrong. The difficulty is that I, at least,
do not see the connection between this sentiment and Thoreau's ac-
tion. Nor, it seems to me, does Thoreau. He says:
It is for no particular item in the tax-bill that I refuse to pay it.
I simply wish to refuse allegiance to the State, to withdraw
and stand aloof from it effectually. I do not care to trace the
course of my dollar, if I could, till it buys a man or a musket
to shoot one with-the dollar is innocent-but I am con-
cerned to trace the effects of my allegiance. 242
Unlike Socrates, who maintained a strong allegiance to the State,
despite its injustices, Thoreau cannot imagine a way to distinguish
240 VARIORUM, supra note 217, at 39.
241 Id. at 40.
242 Id. at 50.
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between the State's injustice, and his participation in it as a citizen.
The only way he can disavow his connection with the State that con-
dones slavery and wages an unjust war against Mexico is for him to
disengage completely, to de-pledge allegiance, although he has never
really pledged allegiance in the first place. In refusing to pay an ear-
lier State assessment, one to support the Church, Thoreau had the fol-
lowing statement filed with the town clerk: "Know all men by these
presents, that I, Henry Thoreau, do not wish to be regarded as a mem-
ber of any incorporated society which I have not joined." 243 By this
he meant the church, of course. Tellingly, he adds,"If I had known
how to name them, I should then have signed off in detail from all the
societies which I never signed on to; but I did not know where to find
a complete list.''244 It is surely possible that one of those unnamed
"societies" was that of the State. At least he is clear that he considers
no duties to the State as his own. For example, he thinks "[a]ll voting
is a sort of gaming," and its "obligation" no more than "expedi-
ency.'245 Moreover, he finds there to be no duty to engage in any po-
litical activity, which the State provides for remedying evil laws or
policies. He says, "I know not of such ways. They take too much
time, and a man's life will be gone. I have other affairs to attend to. I
came into this world, not chiefly to make this a good place to live in,
but to live in it, be it good or bad."246 And further, "It is not my busi-
ness to be petitioning the Governor or the Legislature any more than
it is theirs to petition me; and, if they should hear not my petition,
what should I do then? But in this case the State has provided no
way: its very Constitution is the evil." 247 And finally, "I am not re-
sponsible for the successful working of the machinery of society. 248
Having no duties to the State and believing the very Constitution
is evil, Thoreau declares "war with the State," but he does so after his
own "fashion"; moreover, he "will still make what use and get what
advantage of her I can, as is usual in such cases." 249 These sentiments
exhibit very grave defects in Thoreau's theory and practice of what he
calls civil disobedience. Surely there are duties each person has, if
not to the State as such, at least to his or her neighbors, as members of
the body politic. Thoreau's payment of the "highway tax" indicates
he believed in some such obligation, but his thinking was none too
clear about it. If the Constitution had a grave defect in it, it did so
243 Id. at 45.
244 Id.
245 Id at 36-37.
246 Id. at 40.
247 Id. at40-41.
24 Id. at46-47.
29 Id. at 50.
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from the beginning in which there was formed a union of states, half-
free and half-slave. Does that justify a revolution against the free
State of Massachusetts because it belongs to such a union? Thoreau
does not even attempt to make the case. Surely slavery is a great
moral evil, but on the issue of the war against Mexico, some histori-
ans have questioned whether the war amounted to "unjust aggres-
sion."5 0 Again, the case needs to be made. Even granted it could be
made, is revolution justified? What means to that end are justified?
Assuming some unjust laws and policies involving slavery and the
Mexican War, is the withholding of taxes the appropriate response?
It can be argued that the withholding of taxes is a truly revolu-
tionary act, one that does strike at the heart of government insofar as a
citizen can do so without actually taking up arms. For Hugo Bedau,
"tax resistance undercuts the possibility of any government; Hobbes
did not exaggerate when he spoke of revenues as 'the sanguinification
of the commonwealth.'251
Moreover, Gandhi thought the non-payment of taxes a last resort
in non-cooperation with the State.22 Unlike Thoreau, Gandhi truly
was a revolutionary; he wanted British government overturned and
self-rule for the Indians to prevail. I say this is unlike Thoreau, be-
cause Thoreau does not really want to "overthrow" the government,
despite his high rhetoric. He just wants it to change its unjust laws
and policies, though, admittedly, in his utopian moments, he wants it
to eventually whither away. But consider how he talks toward the
end of his essay:
I do not wish to quarrel with any man or nation. I do not
wish to split hairs, to make fine distinctions, or set myself up
as better than my neighbors. I seek rather, I may say, even an
excuse for conforming to the laws of the land. I am but too
ready to conform to them. Indeed, I have reason to suspect
myself on this head; and each year, as the tax-gatherer comes
round, I find myself disposed to review the acts and position
of the general and State governments, and the spirit of the
people, to discover a pretext for conformity2
3
And later:
Seen from a lower point of view, the Constitution, with all its
faults, is very good; the law and the courts are very respect-
able; even this State and this American government are, in
250 See ALLAN NEVINS & HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, AMERICA 199 (3d ed. 1966).
251 Bedau, supra note 218, at 22.
252 Id.
253 VARIORUM, supra note 217, at 51-52.
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many respects, very admirable and rare things, to be thankful
for, such as a great many have described them. 4
In the end, he slips back into his idealistic, utopian mode. After
giving grudging support to the Constitution, he moves away, saying
that from the highest standpoint, the Constitution is not worth think-
ing about at all.255 For he envisions a State which is no State, but has
dissolved into a glorious group of individual, self-reliant men. He
ends his essay this way:
I please myself with imagining a State at last which can af-
ford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with re-
spect as a neighbor; which even would not think it inconsis-
tent with its own repose, if a few were to live aloof from it,
not meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the
duties of neighbors and fellow-men. A State which bore this
kind of fruit, and suffered it to drop off as fast as it ripened,
would prepare the way for a still more perfect and glorious
State, which also I have imagined, but not yet anywhere
seen.
256
In the end, Civil Disobedience is best read as a wonderful piece of
"narrative art," rather than as a profound political tract. In an insight-
ful article, Barry Wood makes this suggestion and goes on to show
how the essay compares both to Dante's journey in the Divine Com-
edy and to much of Thoreau's other work, which Wood sees as mov-
ing journey-like from the real to the transcendent.2 7 As a political
tract, it moves confusingly between a utopian dream of no govern-
ment and a heart-felt plea for "better government." Taken as a whole,
I do not read it as a call to revolution, but as the vigorous protest of a
man who believes his government is deeply involved in injustices. It
is the form of that protest that concerns me. Thoreau simply stopped
paying one particular tax. After he was "caught" and sent to jail for a
night, he went "public" with a mythic narrative polemic about the
matter, emphasizing what was no doubt always his prime motive-to
protest injustice and to symbolically withdraw allegiance to the State
that perpetuated injustice. The protest is a mute one, however, and
the symbolic disallegiance is symbolic to no one but the self, if it is
not made public. Of course it was later made modestly public first by
the arrest itself, then, some eighteen months later, by his speech at the
254 Id. at 52.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 55.
2 Barry Wood, Thoreau's Narrative Art in "Civil Disobedience," in Norton, supra note
218, at 421-28.
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Lyceum. Although Thoreau probably welcomed the arrest itself when
it finally came, and as his jailer reported it made him "mad as the
devil to be released"; nevertheless, Thoreau went huckleberry picking
immediately afterward, and made not much mention of it until his
Lyceum speech.258  One prominent Thoreau scholar, Carl Bode,
thought the experience in jail "helped to embitter and harden Thoreau
to such an extent that in the next decade he could approve of armed
rebellion, of war itself. And that was what John Brown determined to
wage against the United States of America."5 9 Thoreau penned a
moving tribute to Brown, and clearly saw him as a hero. This legacy
of Thoreau was captured by Walt Whitman, who said what he ad-
mired most in Thoreau was his "lawlessness. '' 26° Perhaps that praise
from Whitman is too harsh a condemnation from one such as myself.
But what was going on? He did not pay the poll tax for four years,
and made something of it only in a speech delivered eighteen months
after he was arrested and jailed for non-payment. His first mention of
his night in jail was an oblique one.261 Then he published the follow-
ing version in the pages on his masterpiece, Walden:
One afternoon, near the end of the first summer, when I went
to the village to get a shoe from the cobbler's, I was seized
and put into jail, because, as I have elsewhere related, I did
not pay a tax to, or recognize the authority of, the state which
buys and sells men, women, and children, like cattle at the
door of its senate-house. I had gone down to the woods for
other purposes. But, wherever a man goes, men will pursue
and paw him with their dirty institutions, and, if they can,
constrain him to belong to their desperate odd-fellow society.
It is true, I might have resisted forcibly with more or less ef-
fect, might have run "amok" against society; but I preferred
that society should run "amok" against me, it being the des-
perate party. However, I was released the next day, obtained
my mended shoe, and returned to the woods in season to get
my dinner of huckleberries on Fair-Haven Hill.
262
Most telling of Thoreau's overall position is this sentence quoted
above: "But, wherever a man goes, men will pursue and paw him
with their dirty institutions, and, if they can, constrain him to belong
258 See Walter Harding, Introduction to VARIORUM, supra note 217, at 11-27.
259 PORTABLE THOREAU, supra note 232, at 692.
260 See Norton, supra note 218, at 376 n.3.
261 The characterization was made by Barry Wood, noting a reference to the incident in
Thoreau's book, A WEEK ON THE CONCORD AND MERRIMACK RIVERS (1849). See Wood,
supra note 257, at 422 n.6.
262 See Wood, supra note 257, at 422-23 (quoting HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 115-
16 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1992) (1854)).
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to their desperate odd-fellow society." 263 This is the Thoreau who
concedes no authority to the government at all, damning it as made of
"dirty institutions," and ridiculing it and membership in it as a "des-
perate odd-fellow society." 2 4 Presumably he will obey or disobey as
he sees fit, without justification. So there is no obligation to obey
even 'just" lawsY 5 They can be ignored because, presumably, they
emanate from "dirty institutions," or, as he maintains in Civil Disobe-
dience, because he did not recognize nor consent to state authority.
Does he mean he did not consent to the authority of the government
in question? Or to the poll tax as such? Or to any tax? Thoreau does
not say. Thus, it is no wonder that Whitman sees him as a type of
lawless man. Remember, this is not a case where the broken law it-
self is "unjust," like the fugitive slave law, but a case where the gov-
ernment is involved in slavery and in fighting an arguably unjust war.
This is not a case where the only way to break the law and reach the
moral good end is clandestinely. Here, secret lawbreaking looks like,
well, simply lawbreaking. As Hugo Bedau says:
[Thoreau] is at his most vexing when he remarks, for in-
stance, "I quietly declare war with the State, after my fashion,
though I will still make what use and get what advantage of
her I can, as is usual in such cases." Is this the flippant aside
of one who judges the State so corrupt that there is no moral
taint in gaining selfish advantage from it where and when he
can? Or is it the somewhat embarrassed confession of a
cheat, of one who cannot deny (but refuses to acknowledge)
the indispensable benefits provided even by a government
which tolerates slave-holding and sporadic outbursts of ex-
pansionist warfare? One cannot be certain.2
6
If the burdens argument from "fair play"267 has any bite, it is here.
Thoreau wants it both ways, or, actually, he simply wants it his own
way, as if he were not responsible at all for his neighbors. That seems
to me to be an unethical stance, though, of course, I doubt not for one
minute Thoreau's sincerity, honesty, or his conscientious integrity. It
is for people like Thoreau and those potentially influenced by such a
good man that civil disobedience-in the sense lived by Martin Lu-




266 Bedau, supra note 218, at 21.
2 See Rawls, supra note 77.
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others268---could be and should be a clarion call for better politically
and morally responsible action.
B. Letter from Birmingham City Jail
Although Martin Luther King, Jr. respected Thoreau's contribu-
tion to the theory and practice of civil disobedience,269 it was from
Mahatma Gandhi's life-long pursuit of satyagraha, a complex tech-
nique of social and political action, that King derived his own version
of civil disobedience in America. King's version was also deeply
rooted in the Christian gospels. As a young seminarian, King be-
lieved that Jesus' admonition to "turn the other cheek," and "love
your enemies" was valid only in conflicts between individualsY
0
"When racial groups and nations are in conflict," he said, "a more
realistic approach is necessary." 271 Then he encountered Gandhi, and
King's "skepticism concerning the power of love gradually dimin-
ished. ' 2 72 For Gandhi, satyagraha is comprised of three principles:
truth, non-violence, and self-sacrifice.273 In turn, these three generate
immensely complicated ideas, not easily unpacked. Joan Bondurant
has summarized them, briefly, as follows:
The truth concept as it functions in the Gandhian tech-
nique of satyagraha has been shown to be that of relative
truth. The objective standard by which truth can be judged is
a human standard expressed in terms of human needs. The
proper means for discovering truth in those terms cannot,
then, result in human harm or frustrate rather than fulfill hu-
man needs-for in such a procedure truth would become trav-
esty. The discovery of truth, or the resolution of conflict aris-
ing out of differences of opinion as to what is truth, must be
prosecuted through non-violent action. Action based on the
refusal to do harm often requires dealing with violence that
may be instigated by the opponent in a conflict. Self-
suffering is this further means by which relative truth is
tested. 27
To the three fundamentals of satyagraha may be added certain
corollary elements. Truth in satyagraha leads to an ethical human-
ism. It follows that ahimsa (non-violence), which includes the con-
268 See also Bedau, supra note 218 (collected essays).
269 Id. at 53-54.
270 THE QUIET BATLE 240-91 (Mulford Q. Sibley ed. 1963).
271 Id. at 290.
272 Id. at 291.
273 JOAN V. BONDURANT, CONQUEST OF VIOLENCE 16 (1965).
274 Id. at 31.
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cept of love, leads in turn to social service. Self-suffering-not for its
own sake, but for demonstration of sincerity, and flowing from re-
fusal to injure the opponent while at the same time holding to the
truth-implies sacrifice and preparation for sacrifice, even to the
death.
Such are the principles that infuse the concept of satyagraha.
When these principles are applied to specific political and social ac-
tion, the tools of civil disobedience-non-cooperation, non-violent
strike, and constructive program-are devised.275
Thus, for Gandhi, civil disobedience is but one form of non-
violent action, backed by satyagraha, a philosophy of conflict resolu-
tion that is morally and spiritually stringent. Painted against a larger
background of protest against colonial rule, Gandhi's ideas and prac-
tices also have to be understood within a context that was truly revo-
lutionary. His ultimate goal was independence from British rule in
India. However, he originally fashioned satyagraha as a unique ethi-
cal strategy to resist racially discriminatory practices in South Af-
rica.276 Thus, applications to King's efforts to obtain justice for
blacks in America are sometimes fairly straightforward. Most impor-
tantly, Gandhi, like Socrates, was committed to an ethical stance that
eschewed "injury" to others.2 7 What crucially separates both Gandhi
and King from Socrates, as well as from Antigone and Thoreau, is
that law-breaking by Gandhi and King was conceived and executed as
part of a mass movement, not simply as the conscientious act of a
single person. Presumably, other factors must be considered in mak-
ing a moral analysis of group as opposed to individual actions.
Moreover, the moral analysis of the acts of a leader of a mass move-
ment or group adds another complication. Insofar as King and Gan-
dhi need to be distinguished from each other, this may best be done
within the context of commenting on King's great Letter from Bir-
mingham City Jail 7 8 I turn to that now, but first offer a few prelimi-
naries to set the stage.
In January 1963, King announced that he was going to Birming-
ham, Alabama to lead demonstrations until "Pharaoh lets God's peo-
ple go." 279 At that time the civil rights movement was stalled. An
effort to desegregate public transportation in Albany, Georgia, had
275 Id.
276 See THE ESSENTIAL GANDHI 84-111 (Louis Fischer ed. 1962).
2n Id. at 88 (stating that "in Satyagraha, physical force is forbidden, even in the most fa-
vorable circumstances").
278 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, reprinted in Bedau, supra
note 218, at 72-89 [hereinafter Letter].
279 STEPHEN B. OATES, LET THE TRUMPET SOUND: THE LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR. 205 (1982).
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met with disaster. King's personal crusade to convince President
Kennedy to act boldly in the cause of civil rights was a failure. The
movement needed to be re-charged. In King's own view, Birming-
ham was "the most thoroughly segregated city in the country." 'i=
There was a constant threat of violence, with Police Commissioner
"Bull" Connor promising there would be blood in the streets before
Birmingham would desegregate. Connor hurled epithets at the Su-
preme Court after its decision in Brown v. Board of Education,21 and
even offered to fight the Attorney General of the United States. 82
Black leadership in the city had been urging King's help for some
time. King particularly admired Fred Shuttlesworth, head of the local
affiliate to King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference, who
had been struggling to desegregate the city's public facilities, only to
be harassed and jailed by Connor.2 3 Gangs of whites bombed the
homes of blacks regularly. Birmingham was a dangerous place, a
sewer of racial hatred and intolerance. King knew this, and planned
carefully around this reality, while remaining in the midst of it.2s4 He
believed Connor would lose his temper, and the careful plan he put
together was, perhaps, aimed at provoking that temper. 85 Neverthe-
less, non-violence was at the core of the effort even as he welcomed
the "creative tension" that loomed ahead. However, just before the
boycotts, marches, and demonstrations could be mounted, Birming-
ham decided to change its form of city government from a city-
commission system to a mayor-council system. Bull Connor ran for
mayor against several others, including a more mild-manned but still
racist candidate, Albert Boutwell.2 6 King postponed plans for mas-
sive acts of civil disobedience in order not to have the election marred
by rhetoric on that score. After a runoff election between Connor and
Boutwell became necessary, King postponed the campaign yet
again.287 Though Boutwell was declared the winner of the election,
Connor contended that he had previously been elected to serve as Po-
lice Commissioner until 1965, resulting in rival city governments and
a long court battle to come.28 8 Meanwhile, despite divisions even in
the black community about whether Boutwell ought to be given a
chance to change things, King proceeded to launch his non-violent
280 Id. at 202.
u' 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
282 OATES, supra note 279, at 204.
283 Id. at 201.
284 Id. at 204-05.
285 Id. at 204.
286 Id. at 207.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 208.
[Vol. 52:655
ETHICS IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW
campaign. 289 King believed Boutwell to be "just a dignified Bull
Connor," pointing out that as a state senator he had authored legisla-
tion thwarting the historic Brown v. Board of Education decision.29
After but a few days of marches and protests, a state-court injunction
issued, forbidding King and the others from "conducting demonstra-
tions." 291 Earlier King had been resigned to go to jail himself in Bir-
mingham. Now he determined to do so by violating the injunction,
symbolically for a Christian, on Good Friday. Despite a lack of funds
for bail money, King was as good as his word. He marched without a
permit to do so, was arrested and immediately thrown into solitary
confinement.292 Several days later, after a phone call from President
Kennedy to the Birmingham authorities had rendered his confinement
more comfortable,293 King read a statement in the local paper from
eight white Christian and Jewish clergymen of Alabama, which "re-
hearsed the standard objection to the protests (they were unwise and
untimely and run in part by "outsiders"), praised the Birmingham po-
lice for their restraint, and urged local Negroes to shun the distur-
bances and press their case in the courts rather than the streets."
2 4
What happened next is well-expressed by one of King's biographers,
Stephen Oates:
As King read over their statement, he had an inspiration.
He was going to compose a rebuttal to those clergymen in the
form of an open letter, a letter such as Paul might have sent
them. He sensed a historic opportunity here, a chance not
only to address the moral voice of the white South, but also
to produce a defense of the movement with profound sym-
bolic import. Would not all America be stirred by a calm and
reasonable disquisition on nonviolence, written by a Chris-
tian minister held in jail in the most segregated city in the
country?
2 95
Addressed to "My Dear Fellow Clergymen," King began by say-
ing he wanted to answer the charges put forth in the statement be-
cause, "I feel you are men of genuine goodwill and your criticisms are
sincerely set forth., 296 He denied being an "outsider." He was in-
vited to come to Birmingham by members of a local organization tied
289 Id.
290 Id.
29, md at 211.
292 Id. at213.
293 Id. at 214.
294 Id. at 215.
295 Id.
296 Letter, supra note 278, at 72.
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to his own national organization; but most importantly, there was "in-
justice" in the city, and that was a threat to people everywhere, as all
communities and states in the union are interrelated. He began then
to articulate his position.
First King laid out the "four basic steps" in a non-violent cam-
paign. These are both tactical and justifying, clearly Gandhian in ori-
gin.
(1) Make a factual determination as to whether "injustices
are alive." Birmingham was the most thoroughly segregated city in
the United States. It had a clear and ugly history of police brutality
and unjust treatment of blacks. Injustices were rampant in the city.297
(2) Negotiate. This had been tried and resulted in agreements
and promises made by local business leaders that were ultimately
broken. Local political leaders "refused to engage in good faith nego-
tiation., ' 8
(3) Engage in self-purification. Workshops on non-violence
were held to help those involved in demonstrations to "accept blows
without retaliating" and "to endure the ordeals of jail."299
(4) Engage in direct action. Because of the local elections,
client action was postponed "to aid in this community need.' '300 Such
deference shows a sense of responsibility to mitigate disruption and
harm. Nevertheless, direct action was needed if changes were ever to
come about.
Carefully King explains how these four points are to be under-
stood. Yes, it is true non-violent direct action "seeks to create such a
crisis and establish such creative tension that a community that has
constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue."30' But
violent tension is eschewed. The implication is that violence would
amount to a moral wrong, thereby violating the basic Socratic dictum
that it is better to suffer injury than to commit any wrongful injury.
King actually invokes Socrates as the exemplar of a moral gadfly who
sought "to create a tension in the mind," whereby opponents could be
brought to a "creative analysis and objective appraisal '302 of the
moral situation in which they are immersed.
To the question, "Why didn't you give the new administration
time to act?," King replies that neither Mayor Boutwell nor the rest of
the white leadership will change voluntarily. Invoking Reinhold Nie-
buhr for the proposition that "groups are more immoral than individu-
297 Id. at 73.
298 Id. at 73-74.
299 Id.
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als," King recounts the painful experience of the civil rights move-
ment, emphasizing that groups do not give up oppressive ways with-
out some pressure being applied. °3 Moreover, blacks have been so
brutalized and humiliated that further endurance and patience cannot
be expected by fair-minded people.
It is at this juncture that King tackles the central issue-that of the
protestors' "willingness to break the laws." Invoking the teachings of
Augustine and Aquinas, King reminds his fellow clergymen of the
distinction between a just and an unjust law: "Any law that uplifts
human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality
is unjust. All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation dis-
torts the soul and damages the personality."
3°4
Concretely, King suggests a law inflicted upon a minority not
binding on the majority is unjust, and a law inflicted upon a minority
in a democracy that the minority had no part in creating because they
were wrongly prevented from registering to vote, is also unjust. This
is the reality in Alabama. Even so, the examples King chose have the
flavor of procedural due process matters rather than more substantive
flaws, however much there is an implication of the latter in the for-
mer. More crucial is King's assertion that it is not only permissible to
disobey unjust laws, but that it is also permissible to disobey a just
law that is being applied unjustly. He is in jail at the time of the writ-
ing of the Letter because he had not obtained a parade permit and had
marched anyway. As he said, "[T]here is nothing wrong with an or-
dinance which requires a permit for a parade, but when the ordinance
is used to preserve segregation and to deny citizens the First Amend-
ment privilege of peaceful assembly and peaceful protest, then it be-
comes unjust."305 This is a new idea in justifying law-breaking, one
that actually can be extended beyond the boundaries of "unjust appli-
cation" by those attempting to address unjust laws or policies that
cannot be violated directly. For example, Thoreau's refusal to pay the
poll tax could have been a way to protest the Mexican War and the
existence of lawful slavery if it had been done as King's protest had
been done, in a way that simultaneously thwarts the law and yet ex-
presses "the very highest respect for law."30 What characterizes that
kind of law-breaking? In King's words it must be done, "openly, lov-
ingly ... and with a willingness to accept the penalty.' '307 One might
even break a just law if the object is to protest injustice and the man-
33 l at 75-77.
304 Id. at 77.
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ner of the protest is civil, respectful, and marked by self-sacrifice and
love for the community. At least this is the civilly disobedient way-
the way to conduct disobedience within a tradition that simultane-
ously expresses respect for law.
In addition to Augustine and Aquinas, King cites Martin Buber
and Paul Tillich to underscore how segregation-separation from the
community-is a sin.30 8 He also invokes examples from both the He-
brew Bible and Christian scripture for examples of law defiance in
obedience to higher law.
309
King calls these acts of law-breaking "civil disobedience," but
clearly they are simply acts of resistance to law by those who would
not do anything that is forbidden by God. The Hebrew Bible story to
which King refers is the refusal by Shadrach, Meshack, and Abed-
nego to obey Nebuchadnezzar's decree to worship a golden idol.31°
Although non-specific, King's reference to "early Christians" who
were willing to die rather than submit to unjust Roman laws is simi-
lar.311 King also credits Socrates with practicing civil disobedience,
but his example must be with reference to Socrates' statement in the
Apology that if the State agreed to free him on condition that he
would cease teaching, Socrates would refuse. Perhaps this is hypo-
thetical civil disobedience.312 The relevance of these examples is not
that King's scholarship was inexact, but that the law-defiance his fol-
lowers practiced was not conceived of in academic terms. Following
Gandhi and his own Christian tradition, King wanted to offer a moral
witness in a wholly non-violent and loving way which acknowledged
his moral responsibility before the law, but his responsibility to jus-
tice first. So he emphasized three characteristics of his law-breaking.
It was to be performed "openly," not secretively. It was to be "lov-
ingly" done, showing the utmost respect for others, i.e., acting both
non-violently but also in a way that minimizes harm to others. Fi-
nally, acceptance of the penalty evinces the utmost sincerity as well
as fidelity to law. As the Naomi proclaimed through Socrates: "[Y]ou
must either persuade your country or do whatever it orders, and pa-
tiently submit to any punishment that it imposes. '313 Here is the crux
of the argument for civil disobedience-persuade or submit to the
308 Id. at 77-78.
309 Id. at 79.
310 See id.; Daniel 3:14-19.
31 Perhaps one of the stories King had in mind is that of the Christian Maximilianus, who
refused to do war-service for the Roman Proconsul, Dion. See THE QUIET BATrLE, supra note
270, at 17.
312 Apology, supra note 10, at 53. Actually, to make the hypothetical exact, Socrates
would have had to be forbidden to "philosophize," then he would have had to deliberately de-
fied the decree.
313 Crito, supra note 1, at 87.
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penalty. As we have seen throughout the examination of justified
law-breaking, it too has Socratic roots.
Academics have taken the raw material of the civil rights experi-
ences and have concluded that Martin Luther King, Jr., and others
were practicing a unique type of law-breaking called "civil disobedi-
ence." In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a virtual cottage industry of
articles and books written on the subject.314 One of the most sophisti-
cated efforts to give academic coherence to this new movement came
from the pen of America's foremost political theorist, John Rawls.
Although Rawls seemed to want to capture the core of King's
practice of civil disobedience, his theoretical stance may have cir-
cumscribed it instead-for Rawls wants to establish a "constitutional
theory of civil disobedience" that (1) "defines this kind of dissent and
separates it from other forms of opposition to democratic authority";
(2) "sets out the grounds of civil disobedience and the conditions un-
der which such action is justified in a (more or less) democratic re-
gime"; and (3) explains "the role of civil disobedience within a
constitutional system., 315  King had no such objectives in mind.
Because King's ideas are rooted in Gandhian satyagraha and King's
own Christian tradition, his theory and practice is broader than Rawls'
theory allows. The difference lies primarily in Rawls' determination
to keep civil disobedience within the framework of his own Theory of
Justice, even as he admits civil disobedience is not the only "form of
dissent... justified in a democratic state., 316 Let us look closely at
Rawls' theory. Firstly, echoing Hugo Bedau, Rawls defines civil dis-
obedience as "a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act
contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change
in the law or policies of the government." 317 Then he offers two
glosses on the definition. First, civil disobedience "does not require
that the civilly disobedient act breach the same law that is being pro-
tested.3 18 This allows for marching without a permit to protest de-
segregation. Second, "the civilly disobedient act is indeed thought to
be contrary to law ... not simply presenting a test case for a constitu-
tional decision." 319 In other words, the civilly disobedient person is
."not prepared to desist should the courts eventually" hold the act truly
illegal.32
314 See, e.g., Bedau, supra note 218; THE QuIET BATTLE, supra note 270.
315 RAWLS, supra note 2, at 363-64.
316 Id. at 364 n.19.
317 Id. at 364.
318 Id
319 Id at 365.
320 Id
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After defining civil disobedience, Rawls then offers a justification
for its use. First, only serious injustices qualify as appropriate objects
of civil disobedience, because the whole idea behind this kind of law-
breaking is that it is "a political act addressed to the sense of justice of
the community.' 321 So it is important to be clear in making one's
statement. Only "substantial and clear" injustices would qualify. Tax
laws are too complicated to be clear; they need theory and speculation
and "a wealth of statistical... information" to be understood.322 Sec-
ond, civil disobedience must be a last resort, meaning legal means to
accomplish change must be exhausted or be reasonably thought fruit-
less.3 3 Presumably this is required because in maintaining fidelity to
law, the law-breaker must demonstrate that all legal means were tried
and the system failed to correct the injustice. Third, a certain restraint
may be necessary if more than one group has equal cause to engage in
civil disobedience. The possibility of "serious disorder" ensuing re-
quires prudence if one is serious about wishing no harm to the com-
munity, an idea built into the term "non-violence."
324
For Rawls, although there are other obligations that tie people in a
community to one another, there is one principle that "is the primary
basis of our political ties to a constitutional regime. "3 That principle
is the fundamental, natural duty of justice. "This duty requires us to
support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to
us," and is "derived from a Contractarian point of view. 3
26
Nevertheless, it is wholly compatible with the Aristotelian-Thomist
tradition. There is a natural duty placed upon us as members of
political communities (the Body Politic). It is not an obligation
dependent upon our consent in any way. For Aristotle, the natural
duty comes from the nature of human beings: we are social/political
animals that need each other to survive and to thrive. Obedience to
law is one important way that necessary cooperation is achieved.
In elaborating his theory of civil disobedience, Rawls took ac-
count of much that was central to King's thought and practice. Both
acknowledged that the law-breaking must be "open" or "public."
Both acknowledged that the act must be non-violent and civil. This
entailed accepting punishment as a demonstration of sincerity in con-
scientiousness. Although Rawls claimed he was justifying civil dis-
obedience in a matter that was disentangled from defining it, he
321 Id. at 372.
32 Id. at 371-72.
32 Id. at 373.
324 Id. at 373-74.
325 Id. at 376.
326 Id. at 115.
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clearly used justifying language in his definition.327 King made no
distinction between definition and justification, obviously arguing for
his non-violent campaign as an organic whole, and appealing to peo-
ple of goodwill to assent to the moral propriety of his approach in
challenging an unjustly segregated and cruelly discriminatory Amer-
ica. Still, the characteristics that Rawls pointed to as "justifying" were
also part of King's campaign that civil disobedience is only a last re-
sort. Black Americans had been almost too patient in their accep-
tance of the suggestion they "wait.''328 And without pressure, nothing
changed. Brown was on the books, but Birmingham was a terribly
segregated and discriminatory city. Rawls argued that another
justifying trait was that the protestor was to be morally prudent in
terms of timing and tactics. Other groups might have equal cause to
engage in similar civilly disobedient conduct. To be too disruptive
would obscure the message and might be otherwise harmful to the
larger society. 329 King would not have disagreed. Twice he called off
his protest campaign because of the concern that it inappropriately
interfered with the civil election process. Finally, Rawls wanted civil
disobedience to be conducted against clear violations of basic princi-
ples of justice because, again, the message would not be clear if the
protest was made against something as complicated as alleged unjust
taxation laws. 330 Although King did not speak to this issue directly,
there is no reason to think he would not have agreed. Clearly, the
injustices he was fighting against were basic and blatant. There is
only one area where a difference between King and Rawls would
amount to something other than one of tone or emphasis. Rawls
defines civil disobedience, in part, as a "political act," by which he
means, "an act guided and justified by political principles, that is, by
principles of justice which regulate the Constitution and social institu-
tions generally. 3 1  Although King's ideas are easily assimilated
into "principles of justice" diffuse throughout the community, there is
no question they are much more rooted in Gandhian and Christian
principles and practices. Rawls clarifies his position by saying; "[i]n
justifying civil disobedience one does not appeal to principles of personal
327 Id. at 365. For example, in discussing that part of the definition dealing with the politi-
cal nature of the act, Rawls says: "In justifying civil disobedience one does not appeal to princi-
ples of personal morality . . . and it goes without saying that civil disobedience cannot be
grounded solely on group or self-interest." Id.
328 Letter, supra note 278, at 76.
329 RAWLS, supra note 2, at 373-76 (describing how the right to dissent is limited when
many groups share an equally sound case for civil disobedience). This is clearly a point allied
to Aquinas' position that the threat of civic disturbance requires a citizen to obey an unjust law.
AQUINAS, supra note 78, at 97.
330 RAWLS, supra note 2, at 372.
331 Id. at 365.
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morality or to religious doctrine, though these may coincide with and sup-
port one's claim., 332 Rawls was trying hard to fit his theory of civil dis-
obedience into his larger theory of justice. That larger theory is not corn-
compatible with religious discussion. Hence his dictum on the neces-
sity for ajustification that stayed clear of personal morality or religious
doctrines. On the other hand, it is important to remember that Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s Letter was addressed to fellow clergymen,333 even
though it was meant to persuade all Americans. King decried the
very idea that the questions at hand were "social issues with which
the gospel [had] no real concern. ' 334 He said instead: "I have longed
to hear white ministers say, 'Follow this decree because integration is
morally right and the Negro is your brother." 335 For King, the moral
rightness does not come from a secular notion of justice, but from a
richer, deeper, broader political tradition, rooted in Socrates and
Aquinas, in ancient Greece and in Christianity. Let me end by reca-
pitulating that tradition, as I have sketched it throughout this essay.
CONCLUSION
Although the Naomi argued that there was an absolute obligation
to obey the law, some ambiguity is to be found in the Crito by putting
the argument thusly: "[Y]ou must either persuade your country or do
whatever it orders, and patiently submit to any punishment that it im-
poses., 336 And again: "[Y]ou must do whatever your city and your
country commands, or else persuade it that justice is on your side; but
violence against mother or father is an unholy act, and it is a far
greater sin against your country." 337 In the Apology, Socrates main-
tained that he would never commit an injustice against another human
being regardless of the fact that the State ordered him to do So.338
Thus, we are left with two Socratic principles at the end of the day.
First, breaking the law is wrong for it injures the entire community,
past, present, and future by at least weakening the myriad ties that
bind the Body Politic together. Second, no one should be forced to
treat another unjustly, however, so disobedience is justified in those
cases if the law-breaker does so openly in a true communal spirit and
accepts whatever penalty the community, through the state institu-
tions, decrees. That is the sum and substance of the Socratic doctrine.
Later, Aquinas added a nuance or two that seems to me to be within
332 Id.
333 Letter, supra note 278, at 72.
334 Id. at 84.
335 Id.
336 Crito, supra note 1, at 87.
337 Id. at 87-88.
338 Apology, supra note 10, at 56.
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the Socratic tradition on the subject. Although Aquinas acknowl-
edged the primacy of the common good of all over the good of the
individual, he did not think that every act of law-breaking represented
an act of violence against the Body Politic. For that reason, he main-
tained that unjust laws do not bind the conscience, except in circum-
stances when "scandal" might be given or where a civic disturbance
might occur, "inflicting a more grievous hurt" on the community.339
All of these ideas seem compatible with the modern idea of civil
disobedience. Socrates says, "persuade or obey," and the civil disobe-
dient offers a speech act openly and non-violently, expressing sincer-
ity by accepting the punishment decreed for his disobedience. Again,
in terms of goals and methods, the civilly disobedient person will not
wrongfully injure another, nor will Socrates. Aquinas adds: Obey
even unjust laws, if by breaking them you give scandal or create un-
due disturbances. In Rawls' words, the civilly disobedient acts to
maintain "fidelity to law," despite a technical breachY04 These are
conscientious acts with political goals. Rawls says they must be first
and foremost "political," but King does not think conscience need be
so contained. It seems a small point within the confines of a nuanced
debate over the precise definition of civil disobedience. Within the
larger frame of political obligation, the disagreement wholly evapo-
rates. Although Rawls does not much elaborate on the larger frame,
he does juxtapose his remarks on civil disobedience with an elabora-
tion of the meaning of conscientious refusal. He defines conscien-
tious refusal as "noncompliance with a more or less direct legal in-
junction or administrative order. '341 He gives examples of the kind
King gave in terms of religiously based "refusals," and even cites
Thoreau's case, claiming that Thoreau refused to pay the poll tax "on
the grounds that to do so would make him an agent of grave injustice
to another.' ' 42 Of course Thoreau said that, but as we have seen, a
careful reading of his Civil Disobedience demonstrates that Thoreau's
position was much more ambiguous. He wanted to protest the injus-
tices of slavery and war-making in Mexico and said he was withdraw-
ing his allegiance to the government. Surely it was conscientious re-
fusal, but it does not fit the Socratic idea of refusing to perform an
immoral act decreed by State authority. It also does not fit the model
of Antigone, who refused to obey the state because the result would
be a failure to perform a moral or religious duty. On the face of it, it
looks like a protest over unjust laws, policies, and actions of the kind
339 AQUINAS, supra note 78, at 98.
340 RAWLS, supra note 2, at367.
341 Id. at 368.342 Id
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King was protesting in Birmingham. The difference is that it was not
done in a clearly "open" way; it was not done in an unambiguously
"loving" way. Furthermore, although Thoreau did spend his symbolic
night in jail, he did not see acceptance of the penalty as part of the
justification for his act, but merely as a symbolic gesture. Finally,
although prompted in part by similar refusals to pay the poll tax by
his friend and fellow abolitionist, Bronson Alcott, the act was not part
of a mass movement. 343 It was the individual protest of a highly indi-
vidualistic man.
At the end of the day, even the individual act of law-breaking by
an individual person must be justified on moral grounds that pay strict
attention to the twin requirements that run straight through any at-
tempt to account for the citizen's political obligation: duty to the lar-
ger community and duty to one's own conscience. The duty to the
community is often manifested through law. Law-breaking, therefore,
should not be lightly undertaken.
33 See Harding, supra note 258, at 11-13 (noting that although Thoreau was an abolition-
ist, he belonged to the "individualistic" not the "organizational" part of the movement).
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